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Chapter I 
Introduction 
  
 
Contemporary economic development, before all else, is the practice of 
supporting entrepreneurial activity. This does not mean only supporting the creation of 
new firms, but more generally forming environments favorable to conceiving and 
pursuing new economic opportunities. Entrepreneurship is a role traditionally played by 
the private sector, but increasingly entrepreneurship is required in the public sector as 
well. The rapid pace of economic change caused by globalization and the emergence of 
the knowledge economy requires a fundamental retooling of the capacity to support 
economic growth. For regional economies the retooling process involves experimenting 
with new patterns of economic activity. Experiments that attempt to change patterns of 
economic activity will aim at changing the institutions through which economic patterns 
are established. These economic institutions overlap between the public and private 
sectors and represent the social agreements needed to facilitate economic activity. 
Institutional entrepreneurship is the process of creating or recreating these economic 
institutions.    
Institutional entrepreneurship in adjusting regional economies often involves 
policy experiments contrived by both the public and private sectors. In order to create 
supportive economic environments state and municipal governments are expected to form 
working relationships with the private sector to design and implement plans for growth. 
Together the public and private sectors form alliances that have been described as public-
private partnerships or cooperative networks.  
While the policy experiments created by cooperative networks often result in new 
organizations or programs that intend to support economic adjustment, the social system 
that defines and administers these experiments is what matters most for creating new 
institutional capacities (Sabel 1993). The influence of public-private alliances in the 
economic adjustment process seems to increase the probability that institutional 
entrepreneurship will occur from within the social system that defines and administers 
policy experiments.  
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Deciding which types of economic activity will be supported by policy 
experiments is a normative question. The responses to these normative questions are 
supplied by the actors that define and administer plans for economic adjustment. Certain 
characteristics of economic alliances, such as the balance of power among stakeholders, 
the alliance’s receptiveness to participation, and the values agreed upon by alliance 
members, will influence whose interests are represented.  
In the current environment of economic change creating new patterns of 
economic activity implies forming new relationships in existing production relations as 
well as supporting the emergence of new industries. New industries must be allowed to 
prosper with the assistance of an adaptable institutional environment. However, the 
adaptation of the institutional environment should not alienate existing industries. There 
is a fine line between conflict and synergy in the course of institutional change. 
Recycling capital, talent, and knowledge are critical competitiveness issues in the 
knowledge economy, and so traditional industries must be encouraged to commit their 
resources to cooperative economic efforts. As McGrath (2003) puts it, “until we 
understand how old combinations of factors of production are dis-assembled, we cannot 
understand the process of creating and implementing new combinations of factors of 
production” (2003, pg. 251).   
While recycling assets plays an important role in economic adjustment, the nature 
of underlying social structures determines how quickly a region can learn to become and 
remain competitive. The balance and use of power, the ability to participate, and the 
ability to influence shared values have an even greater impact on the effectiveness of 
institutional entrepreneurship than any particular assemblage of assets.  
Depending on the mix of these social factors, institutional entrepreneurship can 
take two polarized forms. The first form emphasizes the importance of power, influence, 
and identity through a process of social mobilization, whereby cooperative networks form 
around the assets which are expected to lay the foundation of a knowledge economy. The 
rationale that permits such mobilizations often dictates that the environment of economic 
change favors these interests and in the long-run the economy benefits overall. The 
second form of institutional entrepreneurship relies upon access to participation and open 
negotiation over shared values, promoting agency throughout a region’s cooperative 
 5
social system. This is done by minimizing organizational barriers thereby maximizing 
opportunities for social learning. On the one hand this agency approach is built upon 
democratic principles, but on the other hand it requires the capacity to resolve internal 
conflicts equitably and efficiently.    
The question being asked is: how is the effectiveness of institutional 
entrepreneurship - as a means of enacting economic adjustment - influenced by the social 
structure of regional economic alliances? Economic outcomes and assets created are 
inferior barometers of change than the effectiveness of the process through which they 
are generated. The paper maintains that effective institutional entrepreneurship must 
provide balance to the use of power, open avenues of participation, and reflect the values 
within an integrated regional economy. With these objectives in mind the institutional 
entrepreneur creates social environments that maximize regional benefits through 
turbulent periods of economic change. However, economic alliances can fragment 
institutions by attempting to develop isolated assets or activities. When the processes of 
social mobilization, through which these alliances form, are constructed upon outcome 
objectives rather than process objectives, then fragmentation may lead to conflict, 
inhibiting regional economic stability and growth.  
In order to examine the role of institutional entrepreneurship in the economic 
adjustment process the Providence, Rhode Island region is used as a case study. This 
region is selected because of its historical circumstances, where the economy is building 
on recent momentum in a long process of economic adjustment, and because of unique 
efforts there at creating new institutions to support growth in the knowledge economy. 
This paper will investigate how stakeholders participate in reshaping the boundaries of 
established economic patterns while supporting the emergence of new industries. The 
contention is that while the aggressive pursuit of economic change in Rhode Island is 
necessary, there is also a need for greater participation among traditional industries and 
low income communities in the social system that is directing the process of economic 
adjustment.  
As will be described, the nature of conflict between divided economic interests in 
Rhode Island suggests that institutional entrepreneurship is being led by a densely 
connected cooperative network that is, perhaps, inaccessible and unattractive for some 
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incumbent interests. The underlying tensions among divided interests in Rhode Island can 
be framed in two ways, according to the social mobilization and agency approaches to 
institutional entrepreneurship.  
In the case of social mobilization, conflict is described as being clearly 
demarcated among groups driving change versus entrenched interests resisting change. 
The groups driving change often mobilize around the assets that are expected to be most 
useful in the transition to a knowledge economy. Alliances serve as distributed learning 
networks focused on how to leverage regional assets, and include both the public and 
private sectors.  
In the agency approach conflict is described as a lack of communication and 
agreement among groups whose interests are unevenly represented by policy experiments 
and the direction of institutional change. Agency is a universal human quality, but its 
expression is limited or freed by the structure of institutional relationships. Institutional 
entrepreneurs are those who can direct the process of institutional change, and they may 
also come from both the public and private sectors. 
The difference between these two perspectives is that in the first case conflict is 
expected and tolerated as an inevitable consequence of change. In the second case 
conflict can be remedied through communication, recognition of mutual interests, and a 
process of social learning. The way in which conflicts are framed will influence where 
and how institutional entrepreneurship attempts to create new patterns of economic 
activity.         
The case study will focus on two state government-led initiatives. The first 
initiative aims at promoting innovation in the regional economy by increasing research 
and development (R&D), business collaboration, and commercialization of new products 
and processes. The institutional environment that supports innovation is often referred to 
as a regional innovation system, which typically includes universities, high technology 
companies, and public regulatory agencies among other organizations. In Rhode Island 
the goal is to strengthen the regional innovation system, while also extending its benefits 
beyond these traditional organizations in unique ways. 
The second initiative aims at enhancing the level of entrepreneurial activity in 
Rhode Island. The organizations that traditionally support entrepreneurship include a host 
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of public and private service and resource providers that collectively may be referred to 
as an enterprise development system. In Rhode Island’s enterprise development system 
there is a push to increase the availability of services and resources for high-growth 
ventures, while there remains a host of organizations that target small business 
development. Rhode Island’s enterprise development system is faced with a dual 
challenge of enhancing entrepreneurial activity in the region and determining how to 
internally organize for this purpose.  
 The efforts of Rhode Island’s regional innovation and enterprise development 
systems represent the thrust of institutional entrepreneurship toward economic adjustment 
in the state. The organizations that participate in these systems reflect and influence the 
institutional capacities which the state has at its disposal to meet the changing 
requirements of the knowledge economy. The regional innovation system and the 
enterprise development system play complementary roles in adapting to the knowledge 
economy. Entrepreneurs are required to create new markets and to infuse innovation into 
existing markets. Conversely, innovation is required to stimulate entrepreneurial 
opportunities.  
However, building overlaps in these systems has been challenging, proving to be 
a central area of conflict. Each system involves different organizational actors as well as 
differences in the balance of power and the openness of communication. In order to 
overcome these challenges the state will need to address entrepreneurship and innovation 
as two sides to the same coin, bringing stakeholders from each system to the same table. 
At the same time both of these initiatives must be integrated into the wider Rhode Island 
economy more effectively. By dong this, the gaps that have turned into “silos” of 
institutional activity can be mended and the benefits of new economic activity can 
become net social benefits within the region.      
 
Summary and Chapter Layout 
 This introduction has outlined the issues surrounding institutional 
entrepreneurship in adjusting regional economies by suggesting that the process of 
developing new tools for the knowledge economy is essentially a social process. An 
argument has been presented, which submits that by studying the social structures which 
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accelerate or slow down the institutional learning process, the effectiveness of 
institutional entrepreneurship can be strengthened. This argument has been placed in a 
perspective that distinguishes between agency based economic development and a social 
mobilization approach that focuses on leveraging regional assets. Additionally, the 
Providence region has been introduced as a case study, which will provide examples of 
institutional entrepreneurship during economic adjustment. The primary investigation of 
institutional change in Rhode Island will fall upon the regional innovation system and the 
enterprise development system.  
 The method of analysis used for this paper includes research on economic 
development initiatives in the Providence region based on reports as well as a series of 
interviews conducted with economic development professionals there over a year long 
period. The information gathered on the Providence region from reports and interviews 
will be combined with a literature review which extends across several academic fields, 
including entrepreneurship, economic development planning, institutionalism, enterprise 
development, and innovation systems. Moving forward the paper will detail the ongoing 
process of economic adjustment in the Providence region, while providing a theoretical 
background which will assist in analyzing the effectiveness of the region’s cooperative 
social networks along with the institutional capacities that it creates.  
Chapter II reviews economic development planning theory and strategy as roots 
of institutional change in contemporary urban markets. Two theoretical perspectives, 
agency-based and asset-based economic development, are compared to decipher their 
implications for institutional change. The philosophies behind these approaches will also 
be weighed against various strategies for regional investment in entrepreneurship and 
innovation. Together these arguments inform a series of alternative approaches to 
institutional entrepreneurship. 
 Chapter III presents the history of economic decline and adjustment in 
Providence. The Providence Renaissance has been heralded as a model of urban rustbelt 
revitalization. However, the aim of the chapter is to demonstrate the challenges and 
opportunities that lay ahead for an emerging phase of economic development in the 
region. In order to understand why the region’s cooperative economic social system has 
developed the way it has, it is necessary to describe the previous forms social systems 
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have taken in the region. The social organization of the Providence economy is tied to the 
evolution of the region’s institutional environment, which during decline lost several 
large employers and non-traded economic activity came to dominate. A main goal of this 
chapter is to demonstrate the ebbs and flows of an entrepreneurship culture during a long 
period of growth, decline, and revitalization.  
 Chapter IV continues the story of economic adjustment in the Providence region 
by describing present day efforts at implementing an innovative and entrepreneurial 
economy. This story can not be told without highlighting the role of two economic 
initiatives involving the regional innovation system and the enterprise development 
system. The main goals of Chapter IV are to highlight the process of social mobilization 
through economic initiatives and the tensions that have arisen in reaction to these 
initiatives. The nature of conflicts varies widely in an increasingly fragmented 
institutional environment. However, attempts are made to map out what seem to be the 
major fault lines.  
 Chapter V presents an analysis of social organization in the knowledge economy. 
This chapter underscores the importance of communication as a productive element of 
the knowledge economy, and describes the patterns of social behavior which make for a 
rich and effective institutional environment. Trust, identity, social mobilization, and 
institutional change are concepts used to identify various patterns of social behavior, as 
well as their ramifications upon the process of economic adjustment.  
 Chapter VI examines in depth the current institutional environment in Rhode 
Island. The major players in the social structures that lead the practice of institutional 
entrepreneurship within the region’s innovation system and enterprise development 
system are detailed. Particular organizations are selected to convey the strategies and 
plans utilized for institutional change. The successes of these organizations will be 
compared to any conflict or opposition that has arisen in defiance of the direction that 
institutional entrepreneurship is taking. Additionally, the efforts of these organizations 
will be weighed against criteria developed in earlier chapters. These criteria include the 
use of power, the exclusivity of clients or membership, and the role the organizations 
play in forming the broader dialogue of institutional change. 
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 Chapter VII provides a conclusion by summarizing the findings about the role of 
cooperative social structures for institutional entrepreneurship in the region. The 
advances represented by institutional change in the region are recalled, while the 
challenges are also summarized. Finally, suggestions are presented which might assist in 
addressing the conflicts within the region, while continuing in the direction of success.   
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Chapter II 
Institutional Change in  
Support of Innovation and Entrepreneurship 
 
 Adjusting to the demands of the knowledge economy means that regions must re-
assess the competitiveness of local economic activity. The purpose of this assessment is 
to determine which local industries and activities will drive economic growth in the near 
future. The instability caused by globalization and the rapid diffusion of codified 
knowledge has placed competitive emphasis on the ability to generate and commercialize 
innovations. Innovation and entrepreneurship increase the competitiveness of regions, 
while driving market values that sustain company profits, regional employment, and a 
high quality of living.  
 Firms and regions may have very different views and objectives in this pursuit. 
While regions are intent on creating jobs and raising wages, firms are interested in 
capturing market share and/or climbing their industry’s value chain. However, the 
interests of firms and regions overlap when it comes to the supply of a talented 
workforce, the growth of the local business environment, and the vitality of ideas and 
relationships through which opportunities are created. It is in these overlapping interests 
that assessments of regional competitiveness often focus attention.  
 Technology-based economic development is concerned with building local R&D 
capacity, a skilled workforce, as well as a supportive environment for commercialization. 
The techniques employed by this field include a host of analytical frameworks and tools 
that map local economic activity according to measures of growth, industry 
concentration, and productivity. Assessments yield a plan of action for strengthening the 
areas of activity that hold the most promise for the region’s economic future, and it is 
upon these plans that economic development initiative are frequently implemented. In 
fact, the assessment process often directs the implementation process by identifying the 
regional assets that can be leveraged for growth in the knowledge economy. These assets 
inevitably include local universities, high-growth industry clusters, and the government 
agencies that may assist these interests.       
Regional plans for economic competitiveness serve to mobilize the actors and 
resources needed to strengthen the local system of innovation. By mobilizing these actors 
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and resources, plans for competitiveness form the groundwork of institutional change in 
regional economies. Universities, concentrated and emergent industries, along with 
government agencies collaborate to reorganize entire components of the economic 
system, including education, R&D, industry supply chains, finance, as well as 
government subsidies, taxation, and regulation. By adapting these institutions to the 
demands of the knowledge economy, the integrated network of stakeholders carves out 
an environment that is suitable for innovation, or at least the type of innovation agreed 
upon by these interests.  
All too often the actors within systems of innovation are predefined by the assets 
they control. Furthermore, the economic development plans pursued by them are foreign 
to the industries and government agencies that are not identified as assets for innovation. 
The institutional changes that are enacted by innovation asset/actor networks are likely to 
represent only this narrow, but demonstrably competitive, set of interests.  
While it seems true that the knowledge economy favors regions that can 
strengthen local innovation capabilities, what is less clear is how innovation assets, which 
seem to be relatively standardized across regions, can actually produce an innovative 
economy. If the process of implementing an innovation economy can be reproduced time 
and again, is it still innovation that is being sold? Surely, the capacity to innovate requires 
more than a standard list of assets. Perhaps, the real innovation lies in addressing 
competitiveness through a cooperative network that breaks insulated boundaries of 
economic activity.  
An alternative approach to competitiveness targets institutional capabilities to 
learn, adapt, and promote a sense of agency throughout a regional economy. Rather than 
simply reinforcing assets that are labeled “competitive”, the agency approach empowers a 
wider range of actors to generate and act upon ideas that through experimentation may 
prove to be competitive in the uncertain environment of the knowledge economy. Some 
have called this approach “learning by learning” (Cooke, 1997- cited in Wolfe and 
Gertler, 2002), though a compatible moniker may be “learning by experimenting”. This is 
in opposition to what seems to be an “experimenting by standardizing” approach 
promoted by mainstream tech-based economic development.  
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In all fairness asset-base economic development and agency-based economic 
development both have their merits and drawbacks, which will be discussed below. Some 
may characterized the agency-based approach as philosophical versus the functional 
asset-based approach, but it seems that such a characterization hides behind an 
assumption of consequences that are too often left un-compared. Ultimately, these 
approaches stem from compatible roots. But, the manner in which innovation initiatives 
are implemented in regional economies often forgoes the option of compatibility and 
economic integration, while bureaucracy in enterprise development inhibits collaboration 
in the first place. 
 
Asset-based Economic Development 
The asset-based approach to economic development has roots beyond the field of 
technology and innovation. Asset building is an approach that has flourished in 
community economic development settings. Community economic developers have used 
asset building as a way of constructing the infrastructure needed for economic stability 
and growth.  
However, asset building may not be an entirely effective model for the traditional 
issues of community development - “addressing inequalities of wealth and power, 
promoting democratic values and practices, improving the potential of individual 
residents, and building a sense of community” (Green and Haines, 2002, pg. 3). From the 
community perspective assets represent the various forms of capital a community has at 
its disposal for building toward economic stability and growth. These assets can be 
“mapped” as a way of accounting for and mobilizing resources. The very nature of 
mapping existing resources has the potential to undermine participatory practices. As 
asset mapping seeks out sources of wealth and power, it may overlook those whose assets 
are not accounted for by mapping exercises. Interests left unrepresented by mapping 
exercises have few options but to object to the process of social mobilization around 
other assets.    
On the other hand, community assets can be framed in a way that accounts for 
equality, participation, and mutual interests. “Community capital” is the phrase used by 
Johnson (2002) to describe the state of assets within a community. Johnson outlines six 
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types of capital that when aggregated constitute community capital. These are polity 
capital, physical capital, financial capital, human capital, cultural capital, and social 
capital1. Johnson states that these are, “assets… that U.S cities, particularly those left 
behind in the most recent economic boom, will have to develop to thrive and prosper in 
the twenty-first-century knowledge-based economy” (2002, pg. 763).  
Each of these community assets has a direct influence on a region’s 
entrepreneurial culture. However, it is easier to perceive how some forms of community 
capital support entrepreneurship than others. Johnson’s list of community capital assets 
can be categorized according to the nature of the assets in question. Some community 
assets, such as physical capital, financial capital, and human capital, are more easily 
measured by objective means than the others, which focus on the strengths of dynamic 
social relations. It is this latter category of community assets that targets equality, 
participation, and mutual interests, but it is the former category which is easier to 
comprehend and easier for a diverse group of interests to agree upon.  
Johnson suggests that a region’s physical capital, or its “logistical infrastructure,” 
serves both to attract entrepreneurs and to connect businesses to the global marketplace. 
While roads, airports, telecommunications, and commercial real estate are obvious 
infrastructure amenities sought by entrepreneurs, the growing focus on quality of place as 
a competitive factor demonstrates how parks, housing, and recreational facilities are also 
important physical assets for a region. These physical capital assets can be readily 
identified and measured by a variety of methods. 
Financial capital is described by Johnson as investment in assets that generate 
“community wealth” via community development venture capital, non-profits, and 
corporate social purpose venturing. This list could also include for-profit forms of 
finance. Financial capital is often cited as the asset that is most critical for supporting 
entrepreneurship, though this can prove to be a limiting view. The availability of 
financial capital can be measured by the number and size of equity funds and commercial 
lenders. However, counting these does not describe how they might be attracted to a 
region in need of financial capital.  
                                                
1 Green and Haines (2002) also list environmental capital, but do not include cultural capital or polity 
capital 
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Financial capital, particularly equity investment, is often viewed as a prerequisite 
for supporting entrepreneurship, but the argument put forth that the presence of 
innovative and entrepreneurial activity can be used to attract equity funds only references 
a select group of industries, which might attract equity capital. McGrath (2003) suggests 
that “standard formulations in finance suggest that capital should be allocated on the 
basis of systemic, not unsystemic (firm specific) risk profiles” (pg. 517). For regional 
economies this means that high-growth emerging industries, not firms across a diverse set 
of industries, must be seeded in order to attract additional private investors.  
Though financial capital does react to geography and systemic profiles, 
innovations in the field of commercial investment, such as angel investor networks and 
double bottom line investing, are filling the gaps. These innovative financing 
arrangements serve to shift the focus to firm specific risk profiles, allowing greater 
diversity of investment in innovation and entrepreneurial ventures. It seems that regions 
should not wait for large equity investors to set up shop in town before supports for 
entrepreneurship and innovation are strengthened.     
Johnson’s concept on human capital is a measure of skills present in the local 
workforce. He suggests that human capital benefits from strong educational institutions 
and cutting edge research. Often overlooked is the role of regional employers, which are 
also an important source of workforce training. Measuring human capital is often 
achieved by tabulating the level of education achieved across the population, though this 
does not account for important training received on the job.  
Human capital also reflects the level of entrepreneurial capital in a region. 
Developing entrepreneurial capital presents interesting decisions for institutional change, 
since the nature of educational programs will produce a certain skills profile in the 
workforce. Many advocate strengthening math and science education programs to 
develop the highly skilled workforce that high-technology employers currently seek. But, 
by emphasizing technical training over a balanced education that promotes awareness of 
social problems and opportunities, this approach may actually dampen the level of 
entrepreneurial capital in a region. 
It is clear that developing physical, financial, and human capital requires a 
qualitative view that the asset designation may gloss over. Despite the ability to quantify 
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these assets, there are important underlying questions about the aim of developing such 
assets. However, developing social, cultural, and polity capital is an even more tenuous 
endeavor for the asset-based perspective.  
Johnson suggests that social capital, or the sources of identity and personal 
support, can be strengthened in communities by “local institutions whose responsibility it 
is to boost community involvement” (2002, pg.773). Social capital is applied throughout 
the gamut of social relationships, but it is particularly important for entrepreneurs who 
need to leverage relationships to acquire resources and gain recognition for their 
businesses as legitimate ventures. 
Cultural capital is particularly significant for entrepreneurship strategies. Johnson 
defines cultural capital as, “the policies and procedures that undergird its citizen’s values, 
attitudes, and beliefs about their current life chances and their future opportunity in the 
local community” (2002, pg. 772). Malizia and Feser (1999) provide further elaboration, 
suggesting that there are three necessary cultural preconditions for entrepreneurship 
strategies to be successful. The first is tolerance for new ideas. The second is supportive 
action for the democratic process. The third is, “ethical standards that promote individual 
initiative, responsibility and honesty” (pg. 202). Johnson adds two more components to 
cultural assets, a healthy attitude toward failure and economic inclusion of minorities, 
both of which are policies of, “enlightened self-interest in the global marketplace” (2002, 
pg. 772).  
Johnson places polity capital at the apex of his conceptual model of regional 
competitiveness, revealing its primary role in developing the other types of community 
capital. Polity capital is defined by Johnson as, “the resources and tools that local 
governments and other institutions have at their disposal to improve or enhance the 
health, socio-economic well being, and overall competitiveness of their local community 
in the global marketplace” (2002, pg. 764). He suggests that there are two elements of 
polity capital, business climate and regulatory structure, which create appeal, or lack 
thereof, for stakeholders to pursue, “innovative strategic alliances…that can generate 
revenue… to resolve their seemingly intractable social and economic problems” (2004, 
pg. 764). Through the appropriate ordering of polity capital entrepreneurs and community 
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stakeholders of all types are encouraged to create and utilize the institutions that support 
economic stability and growth.  
Johnson describes this community alliance approach as a “network governance 
model” whereby stakeholders promote regions through “civic entrepreneurship” to 
develop, “cultural ties and profit-centered activities that generate revenues, create jobs, 
and enhance their overall image and attractiveness as places to live and do business” 
(2002, pg. 766). These unified alliances are seen as the drivers of economic development, 
where their aim is to grow the assets available in a community.  
Though the socially oriented elements of Johnson’s community capital assets 
reference shared values, connectedness, and participation, there is little said about how 
civic entrepreneurs should behave to entice these qualities through networked 
governance. In fact, it seems that this point reveals a subtle, but fundamental, difference 
between the potential of civic entrepreneurship and institutional entrepreneurship. The 
subtlety in this distinction lies in the aims of the civic entrepreneur versus the aims of the 
institutional entrepreneur.  
Whereas civic entrepreneurs are focused on creating innovative alliances that 
bolster a region’s assets, a case can be made that institutional entrepreneurs focus on 
creating the environment for these alliances to develop in the first place. In this way 
institutional entrepreneurs are the creators of polity capital, and their efforts can serve to 
define the boundaries of participation, shared values, and connectedness through the 
recognition of mutual interests. For institutional entrepreneurs developing assets is a 
byproduct of a superior process, and it is the process that is the main concern. This point 
only becomes relevant when an inferior process leads to conflict even in the face of 
successful efforts to develop assets. If the process of developing alliances is left to 
existing social networks and power relations among regional stakeholders, there is 
tremendous room for under-representation of some interests. In order to clarify this point 
we will return to the discussion of technology based economic development.   
Technology-based economic development practices often begin with identifying a 
region’s innovation assets and mobilizing a network of stakeholders around those assets. 
The social networks that form to develop a region’s innovation assets are likely to 
involve a very different set of stakeholders than those who would unite to develop 
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another asset such as a local arts scene, for example. In and of itself the fact that networks 
form around separate interests is not a dilemma. However, when innovation is intended to 
be the platform of regional economic change, the isolation of asset-based social networks 
can become troubling. If innovation initiatives are implemented by a select group of 
stakeholders, then it is likely that future innovation activity will be confined among these 
interests. For industries that are not involved with initiatives or are uncertain about how 
to include innovation in their practices this isolation could limit future business 
opportunities.     
The manner in which innovation projects are seeded by technology-based 
economic development assessments may actually do a disservice in terms of integrating 
economic activity. The focus of technology-based economic development is focused on 
developing the infrastructure for the lifecycle of product innovation. Mobilizing the 
organizations involved in the innovation development lifecycle can have insular effects.   
As with community economic development, innovation initiatives often begin 
with a mapping process that identifies which assets are most valuable for enhancing 
R&D, workforce development, and commercialization. The resulting regional innovation 
systems are typically comprised of university research and technology transfer centers, 
technology industries, business associations, and government agencies. Together these 
organizations form a pipeline of economic activity from knowledge creation to 
commercialization and eventually regulatory reform.  
The process of creating an innovation system can be viewed according to stages 
in the pipeline of technology development. The first stage involves building research 
capacity, the fruits of which are then transferred to (or within) commercial interests for 
product development. The product development cycle can be broken down into four 
stages - design, launch, growth, and maturity. The full innovation cycle, from building 
research capacity to product maturity, involves a variety of organizations that provide 
technical product assistance, business development assistance, and funding.  
The process of developing this innovation pipeline creates a community of 
interests around innovation as it has been defined and implemented. The industries as 
well as the technical and business support agencies that are not part of this community 
from inception face a challenge of interfacing with innovation initiatives that seek to 
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change the nature of economic activity in a region. This interface challenge can be 
divided into issues of relevance and accessibility. 
First, organizations must determine if becoming involved with the innovation 
pipeline is something that would be beneficial. Second, if organizations do not see it as 
beneficial, then perhaps it would not be, or perhaps it could be, but those benefits are not 
apparent. This latter case is a dilemma, which can only be addressed by a mutual 
reconsideration of how to make the innovation pipeline relevant to the wider economic 
community. Third, if organizations do see the innovation pipeline as holding benefits, 
then the organization may become involved, or it may try to become involved without 
success. Once again, the latter case is a dilemma which can only be addressed by a 
mutual reconsideration of how the innovation pipeline can be made accessible to the 
wider economic community.  
Ultimately, the creation of an asset is only part of the challenge that is economic 
adjustment. The productivity of any asset relies heavily upon the manner in which social 
relations are structured to leverage that asset. This holds true for the integration of a 
regional economic activity around innovation assets. The relevance and accessibility of 
initiatives that aim at changing the very fabric of economic activity in a region are critical 
issues for organizations that hope to contribute and prosper in the knowledge economy.  
With all the uncertainty that is inherent to the knowledge economy, managing an 
environment of rapidly changing social relations can be a source of conflict in regional 
economies. In an era that is increasingly defined by cooperative alliances, network 
governance, and civic entrepreneurship the task of managing these social relationships is 
of primary importance. Institutional entrepreneurship can be defined as the process of 
creating new organizational capacities for regional economies, but these capacities must 
be recognized as more than mere assets. They should be viewed as social relations 
through which economies grow. The concepts of social capital, cultural capital, and 
polity capital provide insights on what is desirable in these social relations, but managing 
these social relations requires an agency-based view of economic activity.    
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Agency-based Economic Development 
An understanding of economic development as an agency-based activity is 
provided by Amartya Sen. In Development As Freedom Amartya Sen proposes that 
economic development is best measured not by gross domestic product, not by growth in 
incomes, nor by the rate of technological change, rather he sees these as the means to a 
greater end – “expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy” (1999, pg. 1). Sen argues 
that it is the capability of individuals to participate in public dialogue, politics, and 
economic transactions that ensures their access to the resources upon which freedom is 
built, such as healthcare, education, nutrition, and security. Sen suggests that improving 
the institutional structures for participation will lead to improvements in welfare, 
productivity, and innovation. In his view the goal of economic development is to enhance 
individuals’ capability to participate in democracy and the market economy. By 
emphasizing the role of participation Sen places the agent at the center of the economic 
development process.   
Sen’s account of agency-based economic development targets fundamental 
individual freedoms, particularly as they apply to the context of developing countries, 
though the principle of freedom to participate through voice and action can be 
incorporated into innovation economies as well. Agency at its core is the universal ability 
of individuals and organizations to create and seize opportunities. This is the very 
premise of innovation and entrepreneurship. However, agency is only universal as a 
subjective capability, because the structure of social relations can obstruct an agent’s 
ability to participate. Agency-based economic development requires more than a cultural 
attitude of participation; it also requires managing social relations so that participation is 
unimpeded.  
There is no law in the United States that protects the right to universal 
participation in private concerns, nor should such a law exist, because autonomy is 
critical to both agency and the workings of the market economy. However, as Sabel 
(1993) points out laws do exist that protect the rights of parties involved in private 
concerns to seek representation through collective bargaining, for example.  
Beyond the realm of law participation is managed through shared cultural values 
and the political process. Politics and cultural values converge at the level of social 
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institutions, which are governed by a balance of authoritative power and the cultural 
legitimacy of authority’s practices. In this way institutions are essentially public even 
though they may be composed of strictly private interests.  
In the paradigm of industrial production pressures of cultural legitimacy force the 
public regulation of private monopoly cartels, but less intrusive forms of public influence 
also serve to regulate the practices of private interests. The ability to participate in public 
dialogue can apply pressures upon private interests either by influencing the values of the 
interest directly, by influencing the values of the interest’s partners, or by prompting 
government regulation of the interest. In the paradigm of industrial production this type 
of public dialogue often involves protracted conflicts, because the autonomy of private 
interests is both protected and valued, while public outcry can seldom be stopped (though 
it can be spun on its head).    
The emergence of public-private alliances places public dialogue at the center of 
the economic development process, because government involvement implies public 
involvement by extension. This does not mean that conflict is absent in network 
governance. In fact, conflicts might actually be more common in this form of 
development governance, because more voices have a say in the process. The manner in 
which elected officials and government agencies react to conflicting voices plays a major 
role in forming the institutional capacities that facilitate economic development.  
Of course, government reaction is hardly uniform in the federal system. 
Municipal, county, state, and national forms of government all have some say in the 
economic development process, and managing these intergovernmental relations is a 
challenge in itself. (Note: Rhode Island has been chosen as a case study, in part, because 
each of these governmental levels is present and focused on a single region). Government 
agencies responsible for promoting economic development exist at each of these 
representative levels, and their efforts do not always align. Bureaucracy remains a 
problem despite the adaptability of the cooperative network approach.  
It seems that bureaucracy can be a problem both within and across levels of 
government. State and Municipal governments often take the lead in building cooperative 
networks because of their inherent regional focus. In leading these networks state and/or 
municipal government agencies are often assigned as facilitators of regional economic 
 22
initiatives. If the aim is to develop an asset such as the region’s innovation infrastructure, 
then bureaucracy can result from the insulation of some state-level agencies, for example, 
from others that focus on developing different assets, such as entrepreneurship support 
services or manufacturing extension services.  
Even if it is the same agency that leads both these efforts, bureaucracy can still 
occur as a result of the separation of the social networks that lead these initiatives. 
However, this type of bureaucracy is more easily remedied through improved 
institutional integration than is intergovernmental bureaucracy. 
Intergovernmental bureaucracy is more likely to be present not only across 
initiatives, but also within a single policy initiative. This is perhaps most relevant to 
initiatives that attempt to support entrepreneurship and business development, because of 
the variety of agencies that provide services to particular segments of the business 
community. Not only does the segmentation of services provide a bureaucratic barrier, 
but the objectives of agencies that service the same segments, or at least overlap in their 
client markets, do not always align. A widely used example involves the national SBA 
funded Small Business Development Centers (SBDC’s), which reside in most states. 
SBDC’s are motivated by the number of contacts with clients; whereas state-level 
counterparts might be motivated by the potential impact that fewer, but more competitive 
clients will have on the local economy.  
The fact that national, state, and municipal levels of government respond to the 
voices of different constituencies only amplifies the challenge of institutional change in a 
regional setting. In this equation it is most likely that national government agencies will 
be slowest to respond to local pressures, but the onus is on state and local governments to 
create the right institutional environment for successful collaboration across government 
agencies. Though there is opportunity to lobby for changes to national government 
agencies, the necessary institutional changes are more likely to reflect local relationships 
and the local framing of cooperative alliances.    
The fact is that the manner in which government(s) frames the benefits of 
collaboration will hold great sway over the effectiveness of institutional change and the 
patterns of economic activity that flow from these changes. While examples have been 
provided that highlight the role of bureaucracy in the development of particular assets in 
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a region, it is maintained that the central focus on assets is flawed. However, an 
alternative may not be evident to actors in regional economies.  
The primary criticism of agency-based economic development is that it is not 
easily translated into practice. For regions attempting to adjust to the changing global 
economy Sen’s call for greater capability to participate may be too vague2 an objective 
given the specific pressures that challenge the vitality of a regional economy. Some of 
these pressures are attributed to globalization, i.e., job loss and industry decline may be 
attributed to import competition and lower production costs overseas, while higher cost 
of living along with wage and skill gaps represent domestic variants of these same 
challenges.  
In order to address these challenges regions are often concerned with securing 
tangible assets such as investment capital, an educated workforce, and the institutional 
infrastructure to support innovation. But, according to Sen, measuring resources provides 
a backwards view of the development process, because it places the effects before the 
primary cause3 - agency. Despite this objection to asset-based approaches to economic 
development, regions are often ill-prepared to implement a whole-scale shift to agency 
based economic development.  
In reality, the tools of economic development practice may lag behind the 
requirements of new economic challenges. This can be combated through a process of 
institutional learning, whereby learning is a social process across a distributed network of 
actors. A more effective process of communicating new and old information allows for 
new combinations that may reveal synergistic opportunities among network actors. As 
such the social learning process is more than the wide distribution of information. It also 
involves the ability of actors to form trusting relations with previously unknown 
individuals and organizations. Furthermore, actors must be able to recognize 
opportunities, and take action to integrate capabilities across organizational boundaries. 
Experience tells us that learning can occur in a number of ways. Wolfe and 
Gertler (2002) outline several approaches to institutional learning, including “learning by 
                                                
2 Admittedly, from the regional economic developer’s perspective Sen’s characterization of “capability to 
participate” is operationally vague, because all at once it implies issues relating to employment, 
entrepreneurship, civic action, and even consumption.  
3 According to Sen agency (Freedom) is both an initiator and an ends of development: corresponding to 
Aristotle’s (whom Sen references often) definitions of efficient cause and final cause  
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doing”, “learning by using”, “learning by interacting”, “learning by searching”, and 
“learning by learning”. The last of these is probably the least recognized method of 
learning. Essentially, learning by learning refers to self-reflection and self-monitoring of 
the manner in which learning is achieved. Self-monitoring implies recognition of the 
limitations to learning imposed by the structure of social relations. In other words, 
learning by learning searches out the voices not being heard while constructing an 
institutional environment that breaks down barriers to collaboration and experimentation. 
Breaking organizational barriers serves to deconstruct bureaucracies and silos of 
insulated activity.  
Anthropologists might suggest that beliefs and facts are socially constructed, 
while existentialist philosophers might suggest that the boundaries of belief and 
knowledge accompany fear of the unknown. Whether it is fear or uncertainty that freezes 
organizational boundaries, the results are the same. Social activity conforms to 
organizational boundaries, and these boundaries represent limits on belief and 
knowledge. It is not that boundaries must be removed from organized activity. That is 
impractical. The point is that social learning and self-monitoring make organizational 
boundaries more malleable, and this is a virtue in the rapidly changing environment of 
the knowledge economy.     
Agency is a more relevant concept than assets for the requirements of the 
knowledge economy, because knowledge is a ubiquitous asset carried by individuals and 
organizations. It is the ability to communicate and learn that increases the productivity of 
knowledge. Communication and learning cannot be performed by assets.  
The strategy recommended here is to study institutions that support 
entrepreneurial activity (since this is where agency meets innovation) by examining the 
institutional learning process. Studying the entrepreneurial dynamics of institutional 
learning may speed up this learning process, but so too will studying cases in which 
entrepreneurial activity is inhibited. When institutions discourage open participation, 
snuff out the universal attribute of agency, and generally slow down the learning process 
the result is a drag on the local economy. Determining where and how drag occurs is 
fundamental to the process of change. Studying entrepreneurship and drag can help to 
integrate an economy by lowering barriers to organizational collaboration.  
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The burden of breaking through organizational boundaries falls upon the 
institutional entrepreneur. The institutional entrepreneur is responsible for more than 
developing regional assets - this is the task of the civic entrepreneur. Rather, the 
institutional entrepreneur must create an environment of organizational activity suitable 
for dealing with the unknown.  
It is not known how to turn traditional manufacturers into innovative companies 
that recycle talent, capital, and its own organizational capabilities, but this is the 
challenge before us. If a new economy is on the horizon, or actually beneath our feet, 
then the existing assets and social patterns of economic activity must be reshaped. New 
industries will grow, but traditional interests should not be forcibly reshaped as much as 
invited to join in the process of economic change. Innovation initiatives that seek regional 
competitiveness have an obligation to convey a sense of relevance and accessibility to the 
wider regional economy. Anything short of this would not only be uncompetitive, but it 
would also be a cause of conflict.  
As a point of warning McGrath (2003) suggests that there is a “dark side” to the 
entrepreneurial process, whereby entrepreneurship “is not automatically dedicated to 
socially desirable ends – it requires institutions to accomplish this” (pg. 527). Without the 
guidance of institutions, McGrath wonders whether entrepreneurship and innovation will 
continue to be culturally legitimate endeavors.   
 
Strategies for Supporting Entrepreneurship and Innovation 
Innovation and entrepreneurship are widely regarded as competitive factors in the 
knowledge economy. The benefits of entrepreneurship to regional economic development 
have been summarized as promoting the long-term resilience of a local economy. 
Resilience refers to the sustained economic rational of a particular place throughout the 
inevitable process of change. Resilience is not short-term stability. In fact, 
entrepreneurship has also been described as a short-term destabilizing factor that 
undermines existing economic patterns and institutions. 
Long-term resilience is said to be achieved by injecting greater diversity into an 
economy. In comparison to other approaches to economic development entrepreneurship 
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is seen as development-oriented rather than growth-oriented4 (Malizia and Feser, 1999), 
in so far as it represents structural change to an economy – creating a structural capacity 
for an economy to reinvent itself. The capacity to reinvent an economy is theoretically 
linked to the capacity for a region to innovate, but in this regard innovation and 
entrepreneurship are barely distinguishable. 
The challenges of economic development in the knowledge economy are mired in 
issues regarding the appropriability of investment in entrepreneurship and innovation. 
Intangible assets created through innovation as well as entrepreneurs and the young 
companies they create are all notoriously mobile. While intangible innovation assets are 
inherently mobile, mobility in entrepreneurship reflects a desire to locate young 
businesses in places that would seem to provide the best chance for survival and success. 
Also, financial investors hold decision making authority over the entrepreneurial 
business. This authority often dictates that the business locate near the funding source 
(especially with venture capital and M&A).  
A related challenge deals with the uncertain future performance of entrepreneurial 
firms. Directly investing in entrepreneurship and innovation is viewed as a high-risk, 
high-reward approach to economic development. Since future market conditions along 
with survival prospects of any young business are uncertain, short-term return to 
investment in entrepreneurship is also highly uncertain. Given the condition of scarce 
public resources for investment, this possibility of zero or even negative short-term 
returns requires significant commitment in order to implement entrepreneurship and 
innovation strategies. This commitment is often achieved through public-private 
alliances.  
Supporting innovation and entrepreneurship requires an intimate understanding of 
how these activities are manifested by individual and organizational actions as well as the 
regional environmental conditions under which such actions flourish. Wennekers and 
Thurik (1999) suggest that individuals, organizations, and regions represent different 
aggregate levels of entrepreneurial activity, operating together in a self-reinforcing 
system. In other words, individual entrepreneurship feeds organizational 
                                                
4 See Malizia and Feser (1999) Chapter 11 “Economic Growth versus Economic Development” for further 
discussion of this distinction 
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entrepreneurship, which feeds regional entrepreneurship, which in turn promotes both 
individual and organizational entrepreneurship. Surely, the same holds true for innovative 
activity.  
Assuming that these systematic relationships are real, interesting questions arise 
about how and at which aggregate level innovation and entrepreneurship can and should 
be supported. The array of strategies employed within regional economies for supporting 
innovation and entrepreneurship demonstrate there is no singularly agreed upon answer 
to these questions.        
Professors of Regional Economic Development, Malizia and Feser (1999), 
recommend a strategy for supporting entrepreneurship in a regional economy by 
identifying, “sources of localization economies that support existing specializations, then 
determine whether these sources also have the potential to support new entrepreneurial 
businesses in other sectors” (pg. 209). Localization economies are a specific type of 
externality, or environmental benefit, which is spatially bound to a region and shared as a 
quasi-public good. Localization economies are important for entrepreneurship because 
they may provide advantages for young companies with limited resources by reducing 
search costs and generally supplementing business resources.  
Externalities may be transmitted to entrepreneurial firms in a variety of ways, but 
spillovers have received much attention as a competitive resource for entrepreneurial 
firms. Spillovers occur when economic knowledge is transmitted across organizational 
boundaries. The spillover of economic knowledge may be embodied in a technology 
(seen as a product or process) or in knowledge carried by members of the workforce. 
Spillovers may occur through collaboration, mimicking, or by the transfer of personnel 
between organizations.   
A criticism of this localization economy strategy might be that it does not explain 
how regions suffering economic decline or adjustment can develop new localization 
economies, when exogenous forces have undercut the relevance of existing localization 
economies. Adjusting regions often search for ways to bridge this gap. Two alternatives 
are direct investment and input investment in innovation and entrepreneurship.  
Direct investment goes to entrepreneurial businesses or particular types of 
innovation that supports emerging industries, such as biomedical R&D, for example. This 
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approach has found favor in many states and regions attempting to foster local 
entrepreneurship through the creation of publicly financed seed stage capital funds. The 
logic here is that without the gravity of strong local equity investment markets, public 
investment must be made to grow the industries that attract these investors.  
However, while direct business investment may address a specific bottleneck for 
entrepreneurial firms, it has significant drawbacks. Malizia and Feser (1999) suggest that, 
“direct incentives or financing to encourage innovation through new business 
development are likely to increase competition for the same market opportunities, thereby 
reducing the chance for any new business to gain monopoly profits” (pg. 209).  
A third investment strategy attempts to widen the scope of investment by 
targeting inputs rather than individual businesses or industries. Two of these strategies 
dealt with here include the business support resources provided by enterprise 
development organizations and the innovation support resources provided by 
organizations involved with systems of innovation. The latter typically targets 
investments in R&D and organizations that support commercialization of new 
technologies.  
Investment in R&D inputs can be highly specialized, given the need for capital 
investment in facilities. These R&D investments may be lumpy due to the illiquid 
physical resources required to perform these tasks, and so may border on direct 
investment. On the other hand, investment in enterprise development need not be so 
highly specialized, even though under the current model support organizations often 
segment the client market. The primary resources of enterprise development are business 
consulting and financial capital, both of which are more easily liquidated and applied in 
new directions than specialized R&D inputs.  
Targeting public investments in narrow fields is a meta-criticism of 
entrepreneurship strategies. These targeted investments can be said to artificially 
influence and interfere with the “wisdom” of the market. But, at the same time this 
criticism is only a function of the degree to which resources cannot be redirected in 
alternative directions. To the degree that investment in business consulting and 
innovation inputs lump resources into a particular firm, industry, or segment of the 
business environment, they may be argued against on the grounds that success in narrow 
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fields is uncertain. Malizia and Feser make this point by stating that, “the most attractive 
strategies based on entrepreneurship theories do not attempt to support innovation 
directly, due to the inability to forecast markets accurately and the uncertainties inherent 
in new enterprise development” (pg. 209).  
Investing in human capital is another input investment strategy. Compared to 
direct investment in innovation and entrepreneurship, investment in human capital is 
typically portrayed as involving little risk. As was already mentioned above, a strong 
supply of highly skilled human capital is a central component sought in the leveraging of 
localization economies. Investment in human capital can occur through formal education, 
workforce skills retraining, and simply through experience gained on the job.  
Despite being an important aspect of localization economies, human capital is 
also mobile, particularly in the range of more highly valued skills. Highly skilled human 
capital may leave a region in mass if employment opportunities are not available. This is 
a phenomenon known as brain drain. Brain drain highlights the fact that supply of human 
capital does not create demand for human capital5, especially in the short-run. Therefore, 
this is an investment strategy that must be matched simultaneously with job creation 
strategies that stimulate demand for human capital.  
Entrepreneurial capital is a specific type of human capital, but one that is 
particularly relevant in a knowledge economy, because entrepreneurs create businesses 
and employment. Investments in entrepreneurial capital take place in the same university 
and business settings, but entrepreneurial capital is also developed within the enterprise 
development system. The concept of developing entrepreneurs is fairly new and untested 
as a long-term strategy. Lichtenstein and Lyons (2001) suggest that by tailoring business 
support services to the development of the individual-level skills of entrepreneurs, a 
region can increase the quantity and quality of entrepreneurial capital. This is a client-
focused approach that is catching on in organizations that support entrepreneurship.  
However, Lichtenstein and Lyons take their suggestion a step further by 
recommending that an enterprise development system can manage a region’s supply of 
entrepreneurs across a range of skill levels by coordinating service provision. Further, 
                                                
5 This point was made by Dr. Meenu Tewari in an advisory meeting, and had important implications for 
shaping the present analysis.  
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Lichtenstein and Lyons (2005) suggest that by creating a coordinated and collaborative 
system of entrepreneurship development services, the entire system can evolve to become 
an information market that connects entrepreneurs to opportunities in the local business 
environment. This entrepreneurial market function is one traditionally performed with the 
venture capital industry, but as was highlighted above this industry may not be 
sufficiently established in a region, and may focus on narrowly systemic profiles of 
emerging industries. The enterprise development system imagined by Lichtenstein and 
Lyons is an example of how institutional change could diversify the role of 
entrepreneurship in regional economies. 
Together, strategies of strengthening localization economies, direct investment, 
and input investment represent the variety of ways that regions may attempt to support 
innovation and entrepreneurship. In many regions a mix of these strategies is employed. 
Each of these strategies also targets entrepreneurship and innovation at different levels of 
aggregation, including the region, organization/industry, and individual.  
The perspectives of asset-based and agency-based economic development play 
important roles in each of these strategies. While each of the strategies outlined can be 
approached from either perspective, or both, it is essential that the institutional 
environment created to implement any of these strategies incorporates the agency 
perspective. For economic development planners it is easy to see the development 
process as reorganization and creation of assets, but is not as easy to envision how these 
assets may be utilized and adapted by economic actors. Furthermore, by looking at 
economic development as the manipulation of assets, planners may not recognize the 
boundaries being created that can inhibit the type of collaboration that reshapes markets 
to the region’s collective advantage. In order to avoid the problems, planners should 
assume an agency perspective on the development process so that its inherent benefits in 
the knowledge economy can be incorporated into practice.        
  
Summary 
 This chapter has demonstrated that limitations to regional competitiveness can 
occur at any stage of the development process. From the assessment process to planning, 
implementation, and in the patterns of economic activity competitiveness can be 
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improved by assuming an agency-based perspective and by constructing a social 
environment that makes organizational boundaries more malleable. The barriers of 
bureaucracy and insulated social mobilization around discrete assets have been identified.  
The institutional capabilities upon which regional economies are built do not stem 
from assets, but from the ability to learn, adapt, and promote a sense of agency. The 
concept of community capital is useful for distinguishing what types of supports are 
needed to enhance entrepreneurial activity, but the concepts asset perspective is limiting.  
Cultural capital and polity capital as described by Johnson are particularly 
important concepts for the Providence case study. As the following chapter will highlight 
the economic adjustment process can take decades, and the traditions that carry on from a 
region’s history impact the ability to adapt to new economic forces.   
  The process of economic change requires the specification of a new 
entrepreneurial role, that of the institutional entrepreneur. While the intent of civic 
entrepreneurs is to develop local assets, the intent of the institutional entrepreneur is to 
create an environment that is non-threatening and resilient enough to allow the structure 
of social relations to adapt to new economic forces. Of particular importance to the 
institutional entrepreneur is the ability to participate in changing economic relations.  
 Under-representation is harmful to an economy. It is bad for the individual or 
organization that cannot find a path to participating in the knowledge economy. It is bad 
for experimental collaboration. It is bad for the reallocation of resources. It is bad for the 
productivity of knowledge. It is bad for trust relations and the cultural legitimacy of 
innovation and entrepreneurship. By addressing issues of accessibility to the knowledge 
economy institutional entrepreneurs can avoid the “dark side” of entrepreneurship, and 
promote long-term economic resilience through greater diversity.    
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Chapter III 
Economic Adjustment and the Providence Renaissance 
By many accounts since at least the 1980’s the Providence region has been on an 
upslope in a long period of economic adjustment that dates back to the early twentieth 
century. The last three decades have come to be known as the “Providence Renaissance”, 
an era that has witnessed an end to long-term trends of population loss and industry 
decline. Evidence of the renaissance is noticeable in the city’s built environment with 
thriving new public spaces and a steady stream of high profile real estate development 
projects. However, investment in the city’s built environment might be outpacing other 
vital aspects of economic adjustment in the region. The need for high-wage businesses, 
underachieving educational outcomes, and a growing local tax effort (Leazes and Motte, 
2004) are threats to the sustainability of the Providence Renaissance. Addressing these 
threats is the task of an emerging phase for economic development in the region.   
This emerging phase of the Providence Renaissance has been ushered by a bundle of 
economic development strategies intended to stimulate new economic activity. These 
strategies are spearheaded by several collaborative initiatives that target an array of 
concerns such as education, community development, technology R&D and 
commercialization, industry cluster development, as well as support for local businesses 
and entrepreneurs. Participants in these initiatives have designed agendas that attempt to 
manage and direct the process of economic adjustment. These agendas aim at creating 
more jobs, better wages, a more fertile business environment, and ultimately greater 
economic stability in the region. The goal is to instigate change by infusing creativity, 
innovation, and entrepreneurship into the local economy. These initiatives attempt to 
accomplish this goal by mobilizing essential actors and resources to implement plans that 
can generate new patterns of economic activity.  
One objective of this paper is to determine how organizations in the Providence 
region are dealing with this challenge. Chapter IV will investigate how the region’s 
innovation infrastructure and enterprise development system operate and cooperate to 
support local industries and strengthen the region’s business environment. The current 
chapter describes the context of economic adjustment in the Providence region. First, the 
history of this period of economic adjustment will be discussed in order to demonstrate 
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how the region has arrived at the economic challenges it currently faces. Second, current 
economic development strategies being pursued in the Providence region will be 
describes along with arguments on their respective merits and drawbacks. Third, this 
chapter will detail some of the initiatives that stem from these development strategies, 
while highlighting their roots, objectives, and actions.  
 
Economic Decline and Renaissance in Providence 
 The Providence economy has witnessed 370 years of growth, decline and 
adjustment. During this time the region’s economy has been transformed from 
agricultural to mercantile to manufacturing to service based. The Providence Renaissance 
is the most recent era in this span of history, and it should be viewed as a response to the 
decline of the region’s manufacturing economy during the mid-twentieth century. The 
circumstances that contributed to the decline of manufacturing in the region are important 
for understanding the strategies of the renaissance, but perhaps it is more important to 
understand the consequences that this period of economic decline had on the culture of 
entrepreneurship in Rhode Island. As we will see the continuing challenge of the 
renaissance is more than securing resources, but creating an environment where 
economic activity flourishes.   
 The Providence Renaissance dates back to the late 1970’s, when policymakers 
began creating plans to revitalize the city in the face of troubling losses of population and 
employment. By 1980 the city’s population had fallen nearly 44% from its all time high 
of 268,000 in 19256. Also, by 1980 declining manufacturing employment was finally 
replaced by services as the largest employment sector in the city7. However, this service 
employment was largely non-profit and non-traded. Education, healthcare and 
government could not provide the multiplier benefits that declining exports of textiles, 
metals, jewelry and rubber had once provided. Of further consequence is the fact that 
these non-profit employers have been exempt from city property taxes. In order to 
combat these effects the plans that fueled the renaissance concentrated on strengthening 
                                                
6 Providence: Three and One-Half Centuries at a Glance, http://www.providenceri.com 
7 Ibid. 
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retail, which had previously shifted to the suburbs, and financial services, a traded service 
which has been a longtime staple of the downtown economy.     
   Unlike many other industrial cities during this time Providence did not focus its 
revitalization efforts on retaining or rebuilding the manufacturing base upon which the 
city had grown. Perhaps this approach was a result of the city’s diversity of 
manufacturing industries. Even as textile industries were steadily relocating to southern 
states by the 1920’s other industries such as metals, rubber, and jewelry were strong 
enough to sustain the city’s growth for the next few decades. The staggered decline of the 
manufacturing base could have eased the panic that beset one-industry-towns, due to 
expectations that another industry would rise to fill the latest void. However, after the 
jobs created by the employment boom of WWII were erased at the war’s end and never 
replaced the reality of this cumulative economic decline became more obvious. The 
population exodus from the city was greatest (a loss of 37%) between 1950 and 1980 
(U.S. Census). This was surely a consequence of industry decline as well as the 
corresponding period of suburbanization in America. 
 Not only had Providence lost the manufacturing industries that thrived in Rhode 
Island since Samuel Slater built the first water-powered cotton-spinning textile mill in 
neighboring Pawtucket in 1793, but it also lost a large portion of its middle class 
population. The consequences of this economic decline and population loss likely had a 
drastic impact on the culture of entrepreneurship in Providence.  
  During the nineteenth century Providence grew from its mercantile roots into a 
manufacturing center due to a contagious swell of entrepreneurial activity. Samuel Slater 
is often given the credit for being the “Father of the American Industrial Revolution”, but 
manufacturing grew in the region because his techniques dispersed to apprentices, who 
then opened new mills with the backing of more confident investors. Even as economies 
of scale took hold and small mills gave way to large factories, new industries sprouted, 
creating new opportunities for entrepreneurs. In Providence, textile manufacturing 
created opportunities for machine makers and machine makers created opportunities for 
metal industries and expertise in metals dovetailed with a growing jewelry industry. New 
industries grew out of new technical knowledge, trusting relationships with existing 
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industries, and a sense of optimism that accompanied the long period of economic 
growth.   
 When competition in Providence’s manufacturing industries forced firms to 
relocate closer to resources and lower cost labor, entrepreneurial opportunities declined in 
the city. Left behind was a decaying city with a high concentration of non-profit based 
employment and a feeble tax base. Also, as the middle class fled to the suburbs they took 
with them their professional expertise, their influence in the community, as well as their 
expendable income.  
Several factors combined to make the period between 1950 and 1980 particularly 
difficult for a declining Providence. Scholars and business leaders of the time proclaimed 
that large corporations were so dominant that small businesses and start-up companies 
had become obsolete. These dogmatic beliefs could do little to bolster the hopes of a city 
that had watched many of its large corporations move away. As a consequence of this 
reality the workforce sought employment security in the growing service industries.  
The changing role of education throughout the twentieth century played an 
important role in building a service economy workforce. By 1950 formal education had 
long replaced apprenticeship as the primary means of training the workforce. Formal 
education made the workforce more flexible and mobile, and, therefore, less bound to the 
fortunes of a select industry. People also sought job security in such professional careers 
as teachers, lawyers, doctors and accountants. These were among the best jobs found in 
Providence.   
However, for Providence the shift from manufacturing employment to service and 
professional employment was a difficult transition. The people losing their manufacturing 
jobs did not have the skills needed for the service jobs being created. This made job 
security even more vital in the lives of the city’s citizens. Providence’s system of 
patronage during this period helped to provide security for many citizens. The patronage 
system operated as a political machine which would trade votes for jobs and favors. 
Entire neighborhoods were organized, largely along ethnic lines, by ward bosses 
(Stanton, 2004). If the candidate backed by a ward boss won office, then kickbacks were 
expected in the form of city jobs and contracts. Patronage can be considered a form or 
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economic reorganization in a declining city, though not the type of activity that inspires 
economic growth.   
The impacts of service employment and patronage on the culture of 
entrepreneurship in the Providence region are not widely documented. However, we can 
hypothesize that their impact has been a retrenchment of entrepreneurial behavior in the 
Providence region. This period of entrepreneurial retrenchment corresponds to the 
decline of the Providence economy. The decline of local industries probably had at least 
three important consequences: increased uncertainty about economic performance; 
depleted local capital markets; and negative cultural perceptions of industry and 
entrepreneurship. With a large portion of the workforce being unprepared to move into 
the growing service industries, the security of patronage largely displaced aspirations to 
engage in new forms of economic activity. In this manner retrenchment can be viewed as 
the deconstruction of Providence’s entrepreneurial environment.  
By 1980 Providence had lost much of its mobile population, its formerly 
propulsive industries, and the entrepreneurial environment upon which the city was built. 
As stakeholders struggled to control declining resources, opaque networks of influence 
became more important in the city, leading to corruption. In fact, Providence had become 
infamous for its corruption, which contributed to the city’s lack of appeal. Providence 
was home to the mafia, an organization of secretive and illegal trades which finds its 
economic niche in environments of distrust and uncertainty (Sen, 1999). The mafia 
operates much like the patronage system that controlled the city’s government by trading 
favors for favors in a jungle of “insiders” and “outsiders”. Newcomers would be forced to 
assimilate to this patronage system, which would largely favor the in-migration of people 
who could easily connect to existing social networks or those who had few other options.  
This condition of opaque influence is toxic to the culture of entrepreneurship, because it 
stifles open competition as well as the trust required to develop synergistic economic 
relationships outside of the city’s opaque networks.   
While corruption contributed to the lack of appeal in Providence, so too did the 
city’s physical capital, which suited a manufacturing city, but not a city trying to establish 
high end services in the downtown. The land between downtown and the Statehouse was 
covered by parking lots and railroad tracks, earning the distinction as Providence’s 
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“Chinese Wall”, making the area relatively unappealing to prospective businesses. Also, 
the downtown area was burdened with confusing and congested traffic patterns, which 
also contributed to the decline of downtown activity. This inadequate built environment 
was blamed for the loss of downtown businesses and the lack of investment in the area. 
Furthermore, there was little developable land in the downtown district that could 
accommodate new real estate development.   
If new economic activity was to take root in downtown Providence, then the city 
would need to reorganize its built environment and make new developable space 
available. Also, if Providence was to stem the tide of population outflow, then the city 
would have to become more appealing as a place to live. Finally, if new investment were 
to arrive in the city, then the closed culture of corruption and patronage had to be 
breached.    
The Providence Renaissance has been credited with successfully addressing these 
challenges. The renaissance began as a series of development plans, which over three 
decades combined to reshape the city’s built environment. During the decades of the 
renaissance the “Chinese Wall” of railroads was relocated underground, reconnecting the 
state Capital and the downtown, while also clearing valuable land for development. A 
convention center was constructed with hopes of drawing more activity to the area. 
Rivers running through the area were relocated and uncovered, adding appeal to the 
scenery, while also prompting the construction of more accessible patterns for automotive 
and pedestrian traffic. Also, retail was added in the area with the construction of the 
Providence Place Mall. Together these projects have opened and enlivened a previously 
segmented downtown district, while adding value to the quality of life in Providence. 
 
Impacts of the Renaissance 
According to Leazes and Motte (2004), authors of “Providence: The Renaissance 
City”, the impacts of the renaissance have been mixed. The renaissance has had a positive 
effect on population trends in Providence. The city’s population loss has been reversed 
with growth of nearly 14% between 1980 and 2004 (U.S. Census). As a result residential 
real estate development is flourishing in the city. However, the location of high-wage 
businesses to the downtown area has been relatively slow. Additionally, early renaissance 
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plans intended to promote the growth of financial services and retail in the downtown 
area have not come to fruition. Consolidation in the banking industry has caused 
employment to decline in this sector of the Providence economy. While retail has grown 
due to the mall, it has not yet taken hold in nearby downtown districts, where mixed-use 
development was planned to revitalize whole blocks of property. 
Other positives from the renaissance include a lower unemployment rate in the 
city that has accompanied growth of Providence’s reputation as a destination city. The 
improvements to the city’s built environment along with the expansion of arts, 
entertainment, and dining have made tourism a growth industry in Providence and 
throughout Rhode Island. Tourism is a basic economic sector that benefits retail and 
service industries. However, tourism is also a fairly volatile sector, and because of this 
fact Providence has faced recent challenges to building new hotels in the city, which 
would assist in capturing more of the tourism market.    
Leazes and Motte suggest that there are also more fundamental challenges that 
threaten the legacy of the Providence Renaissance. Chief among these challenges is the 
delicate condition of revenues that the city draws from local property taxes. As has 
already been stated Providence is heavily populated by non-profit organizations that do 
not pay local property taxes. Renaissance projects largely circumvented the need for local 
government spending by leveraging state and national government funds. However, the 
weak commercial tax base in Providence has shifted the tax burden to residential 
properties as well as state government spending on Providence government services. The 
public education system in Providence relies on the state to fund about 60% of its costs, 
but the city’s education system is at the bottom of performance measures in the state 
(Leazes and Motte, 2004). Undoubtedly, this is yet another substantial challenge to the 
Providence Renaissance, since education is not only an important quality of life issue for 
potential residents, but also an important resource for training the city’s future workforce.     
The remaining challenges for the Providence Renaissance point to a dire need to 
enhance the for-profit business base in the city. Typically this challenge is framed in 
terms of attracting, retaining, and creating new businesses, but here attention is placed on 
the entrepreneurial culture of the city. Focusing on the conditions that influence 
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entrepreneurial behavior gets to the heart of what it is that attracts, retains, and creates 
new businesses in the first place – new economic activity.  
From the perspective of stimulating new economic activity the Providence 
Renaissance has had perhaps its most lasting impact. The projects of the renaissance have 
served to establish a renewed sense of trust in the Providence economy and its handlers. 
There is new economic activity in Providence, and as Leazes and Motte point out, 
government has been the entrepreneur. By bringing public and private interests together 
over renaissance projects for the past three decades policymakers have overturned the 
negative perceptions of the city and have succeeded in reversing the outflow of 
population and investment. However, as the list of challenges suggests the work of the 
renaissance is not complete, but lessons from the renaissance can be useful moving 
forward.    
The Providence Renaissance provides important insights to the process of 
economic adjustment throughout the entire region. First, the decline of population and 
investment in the city reflects the spread of economic influence to the surrounding 
suburbs. Second, the interdependence of Providence and the surrounding region is 
evidenced by the magnitude of state investment in the city as well as Providence’s role in 
spurring tourism throughout the state. A third lesson of the renaissance is that trust must 
be established among “insiders” and “outsiders” in order to leverage resources and 
interest in the city. Fourth, the perception of Providence and the openness of its culture is 
a signal of how accessible the city is for investment and economic partnerships that may 
extend beyond the city’s borders. Finally, the very fact that Providence has begun to 
rebound from the blow of decades of economic decline is a source of optimism that easily 
transcends the city’s borders.  
As a result the Providence region is preparing for another contagious swell of 
entrepreneurship within the new economic environment of the knowledge-based 
economy. The preparations for this transitional stage of economic adjustment are 
revealed in the emerging phase of economic development in Rhode Island.    
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Chapter IV 
Rhode Island’s New Agenda:  
Innovation, Entrepreneurship, and Conflict (?) 
 
To date the Providence Renaissance has succeeded in reversing some of the 
fundamental challenges to economic growth in the region. While trust, reputation, 
population growth, and interest of investors have gained momentum in the city, the next 
step is to use this foundation to build new patterns of economic activity throughout the 
entire region. An emerging phase of economic development is driving economic change 
in the region toward an innovative and knowledge-based economy. The question is: who 
is on board? Along with initiatives for economic change comes conflict. Addressing this 
conflict has not been the focus of development activities, rather mobilizing resources and 
cooperative alliances has been the main goal. In fact there is some reason to believe that 
conflict is an intentional outcome of recent economic development initiatives in Rhode 
Island. 
 
Initiating Change 
The task of building an innovation economy will prove to be vastly more 
complicated than revitalizing the city’s built environment. The reason for this is simple – 
change is difficult. The challenge of reorganizing the resources and institutions that 
contribute to new economic patterns, particularly in building a knowledge-based 
economy, requires widespread organizational change and massive investment in 
unproven plans. This involves countless influential stakeholders throughout the various 
industries and institutions in the region. Each of these stakeholders has a unique 
collection of interests, relationships, and ideas, which heightens the chance of conflict in 
this phase of economic adjustment. Furthermore, the push for economic change may be 
forceful, due to a perception of entrenched interests and contentious social relations.  
At the same time deliberate change requires plans for action. In Rhode Island 
there are a host of strategies for supporting new patterns of economic activity. Several 
strategies have formed around economic initiatives that build upon themes of innovation 
and entrepreneurship. The concepts of innovation and entrepreneurship are nearly 
redundant, but they each have unique circumstances and implications within the 
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Providence regional economy. While these themes have no boundaries to their 
application, they are being harnessed along sometimes overlapping, sometimes separate 
policy paths. These policy paths are being formed by a series of economic initiatives, led 
by cooperative alliances, aimed at generating new economic activity in the Providence 
region.  
Presumably, no single strategy would prove sufficient to induce the wide scale 
change that is required for the region’s future competitiveness and improvements for its 
citizens’ well being. This means that successful strategies must thrive in a pluralistic 
policy environment. One challenge for stakeholders backing a particular initiative is to 
gain enough support to get the initiative off the ground, while a later challenge is to link 
the initiative to others in synergistic ways, or at least allow their merits to coexist. For the 
region at large this translates to the need for establishing a robust support environment 
built upon an infrastructure of sturdy, but agile support organizations and alliances. 
Publicly funded support organizations participate with private stakeholders in the core 
alliances of economic initiatives in the region. Together organizations involved in these 
emerging initiatives have the potential to revitalize the culture of entrepreneurship in 
Rhode Island, which will help to establish new patterns of economic activity. 
One initiative currently making progress in Rhode Island is a state-wide effort to 
strengthen the regional innovation infrastructure. The innovation initiative is often 
associated with technology R&D and commercialization, as well as leveraging new 
collaborative business models that hold potential for adding significant value to the local 
economy. As with most innovation systems this initiative is led by the region’s 
universities, technology companies and state government funded agencies and support 
organizations.  
A second initiative aims at strengthening and coordinating the enterprise 
development services for entrepreneurs and small businesses across the state. The 
enterprise development system is an important resource for enhancing entrepreneurial 
activity in the region. This system consists of several organizational actors that represent 
different segments of the business population as well a variety of public and private 
funding sources. The challenges of intergovernmental bureaucracy are prevalent in 
Rhode Island’s enterprise development system.  
 42
As suggested above there are several overlaps between these two initiatives. For 
example, each of the initiatives is concerned with growing entrepreneurial activity in the 
area, and each recognizes the important roles of education and quality of life for growing 
and retaining a talented workforce. Also underlying each initiative is an emphasis on 
collaboration as a means for creating new opportunities and spreading the entrepreneurial 
culture that is taking hold in the region.  
However, the process of economic adjustment is bound to yield conflict as 
established interests struggle to navigate the changing environment. There are policy 
insiders and outsiders for each initiative. Insiders work to mobilize partners and resources 
to develop the infrastructure for supporting new forms of economic activity. Outsiders 
raise opposition to plans that neglect their interests, struggling to be heard in a policy 
environment that is focused on change. Likewise, the initiatives that intend to cause 
economic change struggle to gain influence in the presence of established interests and 
parallel alliances that compete for the attention of stakeholders.  
It is within this partly competitive, partly collaborative environment that the 
legacy of the renaissance will take shape. In this chapter we will detail the issues that 
have been identified as region-wide challenges to the momentum of economic adjustment 
in Rhode Island. We will also highlight the specific objectives of the state-wide initiatives 
surrounding the regional innovation system and the enterprise development system. At 
the same time the impact of these initiatives can be judged according to how they build 
upon the trust and optimism developed during the preceding decades of renaissance in 
Providence. The potential synergies among economic initiatives can be viewed according 
to their similar objectives for economic growth, while conflicts appear as threats to 
individual organizations and overlooked interests. In order to understand these synergies 
and conflicts the economic challenges in the region, at which economic development 
efforts are aimed, must be outlined.   
 
Challenges for Regional Economic Adjustment 
The projects of the Providence Renaissance have left some key challenges 
unresolved. Chief among these is the challenge of continuing to generate new business 
activity. This is a goal for the city itself not only to improve employment opportunities, 
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but also to strengthen the local tax base. Of course, new economic activity is also a goal 
for the entire region. Reestablishing Providence as a strong urban economy should be a 
regional priority, because the high-end services that are attracted to urban areas are often 
difficult to attract in outlying areas. However, the Providence Renaissance has been very 
much focused on that city, while the entire state of Rhode Island is primed for economic 
change. The next phase of the renaissance aims at integrating the whole region into new 
types of economic activity.   
This same strategy of regional economic integration in Rhode Island applies to the 
larger Boston Metro region in which Providence can play a more important role. By 
strengthening relationships with businesses, universities, investors, and consumers 
throughout the Boston Metro region stakeholders in Rhode Island can gain access to 
economic activity that the smaller Providence market has had difficulty attracting. 
Clearly, not just any new economic activity would suffice. The process of 
economic growth demands that new businesses provide the jobs and wages that a 
knowledge economy workforce requires. This means that the new businesses sought in 
Providence must produce high value goods and services. According to the Rhode Island 
Economic Policy Council (RIEPC), there is a job gap in Rhode Island among high wage 
industry clusters. The growing tourism industry in Providence, while beneficial to the 
region’s overall image, is likely to yield only marginal increases in high wage jobs. The 
businesses that yield significantly better jobs and incomes are often those businesses that 
continually produce innovative products and services. The industry clusters targeted in 
Rhode Island include health and life sciences, financial services, industrial products and 
manufacturing, tourism and hospitality, consumer products and design, communications 
and information technology, marine industries, and defense and homeland security.   
A related challenge is increasing the level of highly skilled talent in the 
Providence region. Underlying problems include the quality of public education in the 
area, relatively low levels of college attainment, and the troubling phenomenon of brain 
drain. Public education has been a blemish on the record of the renaissance. According to 
Leazes and Motte (2004), twenty percent of Providence’s grade school population has 
limited proficiency in English, while standardized testing scores and high school 
graduation rates remain well below state averages. They also point out that enrollment 
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growth in Providence has increased at more than twice the average rate across the state 
between 1991 and 2000. Consultants have found that throughout the state college 
attainment levels have lagged behind national growth trends. These education trends are 
only made more troubling by the continued brain drain among the areas young, educated 
workforce. Consultants found that throughout the 1990’s Providence’s young adult 
population declined by eighteen percent (RIEPC). Efforts to increase the level of talented 
workforce in the state must address the quality of local education as well as providing the 
employment opportunities that this demographic demands.    
The demand for new, high-wage economic activity in Rhode Island requires 
investment in strategies that enhance the development of new economic knowledge, 
which can take the form of new business models, new technologies and applications, 
market insights, or other commercially viable knowledge. Organizational collaboration 
and R&D are important generators of new economic knowledge. While R&D adds new 
content to economic knowledge, collaboration serves to recombine existing knowledge in 
new ways.  
Attempts to strengthen these generators of economic knowledge present a 
challenge. Organizational collaboration is claimed to be Rhode Island’s competitive 
advantage, because of the state’s small size and densely connected networks. However, 
while new collaborative relationships are a driving force behind the emerging phase of 
economic development in the region, they are also a source of friction in a turbulent 
period of change. The relationships between policy insiders and outsiders, collaborators 
and competitors will play an important role in determining the content of collaborative 
innovations as well as the resulting patterns of economic activity. The nature and degree 
of competition in this collaborative process will impact the level of trust and optimism 
that permeates the region.   
While the recombinant aspects of collaboration are necessary for widespread 
innovation, such strategies would eventually go stale without a steady stream of new 
knowledge content, which is often provided by R&D. Arguments abound regarding the 
important impact that locally generated R&D has on local high growth business start-ups 
and existing industry’s commercialization of new technologies. At the same time 
universities are playing a larger role in performing R&D with commercial applications. 
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However, according to the RIEPC, Rhode Island ranks 48th among state spending per 
capita on higher education, while ranking last in state spending on university research. 
Additionally, industry investment in academic R&D is particularly low in Rhode Island. 
These issues are currently being addressed with new investment in university-industry 
R&D initiatives and a new environmental biotechnology facility at the University of 
Rhode Island.  
Despite these efforts, without better performance among commercialization 
activities in the region advances in new economic knowledge will be for naught. 
According to reports from RIEPC Rhode Island has performed poorly in 
commercialization measures in the past. Successful commercialization activities require 
specialized resources such as early stage equity investment and pipelines of new 
economic knowledge, but they also require a ready supply of savvy entrepreneurs who 
can marshal these resources while managing competitive businesses.  
Statewide efforts to strengthen entrepreneurial capital follow three strategies. One 
strategy is to grow a ubiquitous culture of entrepreneurship in Rhode Island, where all 
organizations are encouraged to act entrepreneurially by challenging existing business 
models and by searching for partnerships that will create new value in product and 
service markets. Another strategy is to directly supplement the perceived lack of highly 
experienced, serial entrepreneurs in the area by using incentives to draw management 
level talent from the Boston Metro area and elsewhere. The third strategy is to develop 
entrepreneurial talent through the enterprise development system. By strengthening the 
business support services provided in Rhode Island more people will be encouraged to 
pursue entrepreneurial ventures.  
In addition to addressing the factors that contribute to high growth business 
ventures, economic development efforts in the region should not overshadow the need to 
improve equitable access to opportunity throughout Rhode Island’s communities. 
Providence and other areas in Rhode Island are still prone to problems of poverty and 
related barriers to economic mobility, such as those often experienced in the city’s non-
English speaking enclaves. The renaissance approach to improving quality of living is at 
least as relevant in neighborhoods as it is in the central business district. The challenge of 
improving the economic prospects for Rhode Island’s current low income residents 
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should be reflected in initiatives that are built upon participatory methods. Poverty, of 
course, is a wicked problem that can be marginally improved through education, 
community development, democratic processes, in addition to job growth in traditional 
industries. Surely, without the active representation of low income communities in 
economic development initiatives there is a danger of isolating these populations from the 
benefits of innovative economic growth.  
 
New Economic Activity: The Innovation Economy Agenda  
Strengthening the innovation economy in Rhode Island has been described as a 
method for “raising all boats” on the tide of economic growth. It has been stated that 
Rhode Island can not compete over the long term with the use of direct subsidies for 
attracting and retaining businesses. The alternative approach in Rhode Island is to 
promote the development of technology and business innovation from within the state. A 
central focus of the innovation agenda is increasing the presence of high wage business 
activity. At the same time the challenge of attracting and retaining a workforce with 
adequate skills for high wage jobs falls upon the wide network of stakeholders attempting 
to implement this strategy. A skilled workforce will not locate in the region without high 
wage jobs, and high wage jobs will not locate there without a skilled workforce. The 
growth of high wage jobs and a highly skilled workforce must occur simultaneously in a 
ratcheting fashion.  
On the workforce side this challenge is being met, in part, by education reforms 
that seek long-term improvements to the quality of curriculum in the public school 
system. The Governor’s Council on Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics 
(STEM) has been tasked with providing ideas to improve the learning process in these 
academic fields. The ideas proposed by STEM range from adding resources and capacity 
for teaching STEM subjects, to involving applied learning approaches that deepen the 
benefits of the scientific learning process. Another idea is to investigate opportunities for 
an expanded role among Rhode Island’s technical and vocational schools.  
Training students is only half the challenge, the other half involves connecting the 
students to local opportunities that serve to create ties to the area. One method for 
addressing this need includes implementing place based learning, which embeds a 
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student’s education in the activities of the community through cooperative projects with 
area businesses and organizations. At least one model has proven successful in this regard 
- the MET Charter High School program. The place based strategy of the MET involves 
applied learning and small learning community approaches to education, and has led to a 
near 100% college acceptance rate among its students. A similar idea for creating local 
ties for students is strengthening internship and apprenticeship programs between the 
region’s universities and businesses. 
The challenge of growing high wage jobs in the region is being met by a host of 
stakeholders from the business, government, and university communities. This 
cooperative alliance is devising and implementing plans to enhance R&D, business 
collaboration, and commercialization of innovations in Rhode Island. While the focus of 
their efforts is to provide benefits to highly educated citizens and high growth businesses, 
the benefits of innovation are also expected to extend to low income communities and 
traditional industries. This is unique attribute of Rhode Island’s innovation initiative.  
The community benefits of the innovation initiatives are aimed at new approaches 
to education (such as ideas for extending the MET program), lowering the cost and 
boundaries to accessibility of healthcare, and connecting low income communities to the 
internet among other approaches. Thus, building an innovation economy is more than the 
challenge of growing high wage jobs. An innovation economy should also promote the 
participation of the less skilled workforce. However, the challenge of growing innovative 
businesses is difficult in itself, and has been the main focus of the initiative   
Building an innovation economy is a lofty goal for any region. There are several 
reasons for this. First, innovation is difficult to engineer. Almost by definition innovation 
runs counter to common intuition and experience. The competitive dynamics of the 
marketplace along with the incremental development of new economic knowledge and 
technologies makes innovation a fairly unpredictable phenomenon. Second, innovation as 
an economic development scheme can be quite costly. Individual companies put millions 
of dollars into creating new products that never make it to market and the same holds true 
for universities and government research labs. Also, the transaction costs of time and 
attention are high for implementing new innovative approaches in existing businesses, 
especially given the uncertain outcomes of new approaches. Third, innovation requires a 
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well networked economy wherein challenges are addressed by a variety of stakeholders, 
each adding insights that frame the issue and contribute incremental advances that build 
upon one another. Fourth, systematic innovation requires a critical mass of talent in fields 
ranging from design, engineering, marketing, finance, and legal among other disciplines. 
Finally, innovation is backlogged by a demand for entrepreneurs; there are more viable 
innovations produced each year than there are businesses prepared to take them to 
market.  
All of these factors suggest that building an innovation economy is a 
comprehensive endeavor, and in Rhode Island it is being treated as such. In Rhode Island 
a series of linked initiatives aim at bolstering the regional innovation system. Operating 
under a statewide strategy known as Innovation @ Scale, these initiatives intend to add 
value throughout the range of products, services, and experiences that are consumed and 
produced in Rhode Island. The intent is to spread innovation as a ubiquitous practice for 
Rhode Island organizations, both public and private. Once again, this is a lofty goal, but 
Rhode Island is developing the infrastructure that has the potential to treat innovation as 
both a ubiquitous activity and a targeted activity as it applies to the innovation pipeline.  
The Innovation @ Scale strategy seeks to leverage the small geographical area of 
Rhode Island along with the state’s dense social networks between government and 
business to promote testing of new business models and product/service ideas in a 
relatively compact and manageable market environment. This strategy is ubiquitous 
because it can be employed by just about any type of business, and it is novel in the way 
that it attempts to extend innovation beyond the pipeline.   
Currently the Innovation @ Scale strategy is taking shape in Rhode Island’s 
Business Innovation Factory (BIF), a non-profit organization that brings together leaders 
from business, government, academia, and non-profit sectors. Together, BIF members 
research, discuss, and implement plans to build new markets and innovate within existing 
markets. Projects being developed at the BIF involve a diverse field of interests, 
including statewide wireless network access, new unified models for healthcare delivery, 
enhancing and sharing the communications infrastructure for port security, and 
experience laboratories intended to enhance the services received by citizens, students, 
patients, and consumers.   
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The Business Innovation Factory is just one piece of the state’s innovation 
infrastructure. Other aspects of this infrastructure are highlighted in “Innovate RI”, a 
report produced by the Rhode Island Science and Technology Advisory Council (STAC), 
which presents a set of specific recommendations that target the state’s capacity to 
generate and commercialize innovation in the state.  
The STAC report makes five recommendations for innovation support by the 
Rhode Island General Assembly, one of which is a request for the support of the RIWINS 
wireless network project and another is a call for continued support of STAC itself. A 
third recommendation is for a commission to study and propose ways to strengthen the 
research capacity of the University of Rhode Island. A fourth recommendation shares this 
intention to strengthen the states R&D platform by requesting state matching funds to 
create the Rhode Island Collaborative Research Alliance. This alliance would connect 
existing life sciences, healthcare, and biomedical R&D programs in the state both in 
terms of knowledge sharing and funding of joint operations. The final recommendation 
proposed by STAC is the creation of a tax credit targeting serial entrepreneurs in science 
and technology fields. This proposed tax credit is intended to attract and retain 
experienced entrepreneurs, who can commercialize new technologies.     
The BIF projects and STAC recommendations represent the central strategies of 
the Rhode Island innovation system, which include business collaboration, R&D, and 
commercialization. These strategies are influencing a variety of economic sectors, 
including traditional manufacturing. The Rhode Island Manufacturing Summit is a 
coalition of manufacturing businesses and public support agencies, which provide 
resources for assessing and enhancing a manufacturing company’s capacity to innovate. 
The benefit of such coalitions goes beyond the actual services provided. Less obvious, 
but perhaps more substantial, benefits emerge from the supportive community of 
traditional manufacturers that collaborate to address common problems.  
In addition to private business partners the Rhode Island Economic Development 
Corporation (RIEDC) provides support to this initiative, as well the College of 
Engineering at URI, which supplies interns and technical support to local manufacturers. 
The university’s involvement in this coalition yields benefits beyond the direct labor and 
support supplied to manufacturers. The students grow local roots and connections 
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through their internships with local firms and these roots may prove useful in retaining 
talent in the region.  
The Rhode Island Manufacturing Summit is an example of a community 
partnering over innovation. These communities are often composed of a variety of 
stakeholders from students to organizations, including public agencies, universities and 
private business partners. It is these types of partnership communities that form the 
backbone of the state’s innovation initiative. These partnership communities are 
functionally oriented around particular initiatives, but some organizations are involved in 
several initiatives. The overlap of actors in the initiatives described here helps to link 
efforts, expanding opportunities and spreading the entrepreneurial approach to creating 
new economic activity.  
 
Conflict in the Innovation Economy  
One organization that has emerged as a central actor across several initiatives is 
the Rhode Island Economic Development Corporation, the state’s lead economic 
development agency, which is directly involved with BIF, STAC, the Manufacturing 
Summit, as well as a business support initiative known as Every Company Counts among 
others. Centrally positioned organizations such as RIEDC hold the potential to connect 
the R&D, commercialization, and collaboration efforts of the innovation initiatives to the 
small business and low income communities that are represented by efforts of enterprise 
development and community economic development initiatives.   
The work of centrally positioned organizations such as RIEDC is formative to the 
process of initiating change in Rhode Island’s economy. In particular, RIEDC has been 
heralded for engaging Rhode Island’s business community, a posture that is successful 
due to the extensive business orientation of its leadership and staff. At the same time 
RIEDC has been criticized by other support organizations as being too self-directed and 
forceful in leading regional economic change.  
This tension could be described in theoretical terms as a lack of trust or as 
conflicting visions of the region’s economic future. However, a practical analysis reveals 
a struggle for organizational survival and influence. Some organizations involved in the 
process of economic development in Rhode Island are concerned that innovation 
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initiatives do not adequately represent the interests of their respective client base. Others 
are concerned about increased competition over revenues generated from membership 
fees and/or business and government sponsorship. Another source of conflict arises as 
organizations such as RIEDC, which are intent on infusing entrepreneurship and 
innovation into Rhode Island’s economy, push to get other organizations to incorporate 
high value added services into their business models.    
Centrally positioned organizations must not only work to connect the growth of 
high-wage businesses to efforts for increasing the skills of the local workforce, but they 
must also connect to the state’s other communities, including small businesses, artists, 
low income workers, etc. At the community level interfacing with innovation initiatives 
is, perhaps, relatively inaccessible to most Rhode Islanders. Isolating the organizations 
that represent the interests of these communities is not a solution for sustainable 
economic adjustment. At the same time the Providence region is in a period of change 
that will require existing economic development organizations to adapt to new economic 
realities.  
Accessibility to economic opportunity is a major concern of some economic 
development organizations. Innovation initiatives are being led by the business and 
institutional communities, which are comprised of development professionals and 
government and business elites who are participating in this process of framing future 
patterns of economic activity in the state. In and of itself, this is not a harmful practice, as 
long as there are avenues provided for the general community to pursue economic 
mobility and ultimately participate in shaping the economic future of the state. In other 
words, the general population must be more than just recipients of innovation policy. 
While the objective of the innovation initiative is make this activity a ubiquitous practice, 
the challenge is structuring projects so that they seem more relevant and accessible to a 
wider population of firms and individuals.  
Traditionally, the field of enterprise development has played an important role as 
a step in the ladder of economic mobility. While individuals in poverty are less likely to 
start a business, due to a lack of resources, those who successfully escape from poverty 
using their labor to accumulate assets are enabled to participate in business ownership if 
they perceive this to be a feasible and beneficial endeavor. It is assumed here that the 
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population of small business owners contributes to the entrepreneurial culture of a region, 
and over the course of a generation their example of entrepreneurship can be put to use in 
new, high growth fields of economic activity.   
However, the presence of conflict among policy insiders and outsiders that 
represent the various economic communities in Rhode Island, even though unintended, 
could threaten to separate some from participating in the state’s future innovation 
economy. These conflicts could even slow the momentum of the economic adjustment. 
Because the steps taken to reorganize an economy are often path dependant, resolving 
these conflicts now could yield tremendous dividends in Rhode Island’s future.  
 
Entrepreneurship: The Enterprise Development Agenda 
 Implementing an innovation economy requires new ideas and technologies to be 
pursued in synergistic ways that transforms previous patterns of economic activity. 
Entrepreneurial activity lies at the heart of this transformation process. Entrepreneurial 
activity is expressed in new collaborative relationships among businesses and institutions, 
in the efforts of researchers to expand the frontiers of discovery, and in the creation of 
new businesses.  
A region’s enterprise development system provides services and resources that 
assist entrepreneurs in their efforts to create and grow businesses. Ideally, as a way of 
boosting entrepreneurial activity, the businesses being created and supported through 
enterprise development organizations would be assimilated into collaborative 
relationships that share knowledge and cooperate in new ventures. Enterprise 
development in Rhode Island is beginning to move in this direction. However, the rapidly 
changing economic environment has caused Rhode Island’s enterprise development 
system to respond in sometimes divided and disorganized ways.   
  The field of enterprise development has long been home to a variety of 
organizations that act as advocates and provide specialized resources for subsets of the 
local business community. These segments of the business community include small 
businesses, minority-owned businesses, micro-businesses, technology businesses, 
manufacturing businesses, etc. As the global economy changes emphasis is being placed 
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on high value added and knowledge based economic activity in the United States, and 
enterprise support organizations are attempting to adjust to this environment.  
In Rhode Island well over a dozen new business support organizations have been 
established over the past ten years. Many of these new organizations have been created to 
introduce new specialized services or to coordinate activities within emerging industries. 
These new services range from industry cluster development to incubator and mentoring 
services for entrepreneurs operating in a variety of fields. There are also newly 
established organizations that provide specialized equity financing to high growth 
potential start-ups in the region. Networking is a service that is being offered by a 
growing number of Rhode Island enterprise development organizations, while 
information seminars also remain a popular service offering.  
The shift in focus of the collective enterprise development system in Rhode Island 
seems to be in the type of business activity that organizations intend to support. While 
small businesses with minimal growth potential are still serviced by traditional business 
support organizations such as the SBA funded Small Business Development Center, 
entrepreneurs with growth aspirations seem to be the target market for most of the newly 
created organizations. The organizations moving into this market are attempting to 
service smaller niches of the entrepreneur population. Urban entrepreneurs, technology 
entrepreneurs, design entrepreneurs, and creativity entrepreneurs are all niches addressed 
by some of these organizations. The variety of networking and information forums serve 
to connect these diverse entrepreneurs to each other, existing business activity, as well as 
best practices in various fields. There is clearly a collective effort in Rhode Island to 
support entrepreneurship and the growth of an entrepreneurial culture.     
However, findings from the Council on Competitiveness suggest that the activity 
of Rhode Island’s entrepreneurship support organizations is “not sufficient to stimulate 
the level of entrepreneurship activity and new company creation needed for a competitive 
innovation economy” (STAC, 2006 pg. 12). The claim that there is a shortage of serial 
entrepreneurs in Rhode Island is resonating among several economic development 
professionals in the region. The value of serial entrepreneurs is that they have a track 
record, which investors can investigate to gain confidence in the leadership behind a new 
venture. The organizations that would like to see an increase in serial entrepreneurs are 
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incubators and investment groups, both of which would like to select clients from a wider 
pool of qualified entrepreneurs.  
In 1997 the Rhode Island legislature voted to create the Slater Fund to support the 
development of high growth businesses within technology industries in the state. The 
Slater Fund is now the early stage financing arm of four Slater Centers that serve as 
incubators to young technology firms. The four Slater Centers focus on emerging Rhode 
Island industries, including biomedical technology, design and manufacturing, interactive 
technology, as well as marine and environmental technologies. Thorne Sparkman, 
Director of the Interactive Technologies Center, suggests that the biggest challenge to his 
organization is finding experienced entrepreneurs to join management teams that often 
include university researchers who are trying to commercialize a technology they helped 
to develop.  
While the Slater Fund helps to seed entrepreneurial ventures other investment 
groups want to see incubators such as these develop a pipeline of quality ventures for 
later rounds of investment. Angel capital investors such as those within Rhode Island’s 
Cherrystone Angel Group serve as a financial bridge between seed stage funding and 
investment from traditional venture capital firms. Stakeholders in the Providence region 
recognize that in order to attract more venture capital investment, the flow of viable 
ventures as well as experienced entrepreneurs must increase.  
The quickest way to increase the flow of viable ventures is to attract serial 
entrepreneurs from elsewhere through the use of targeted investments and incentives such 
as those proposed by STAC. However, a sustainable long-term strategy for increasing the 
level of entrepreneurial capital in a region involves developing and recycling 
entrepreneurs that emerge from local businesses and universities. One need not own a 
business to become a serial entrepreneur. In fact many growth businesses require 
intrapreneurs (internal entrepreneurs) to create new business units and subsidiaries within 
the existing firms. Supporting intrapreneurship is a task that is largely ignored by 
enterprise development, though it could serve to increase the level of serial 
entrepreneurship locally. Over time innovation initiatives and enterprise development 
initiatives could be combined in Rhode Island to target this source of long-term 
entrepreneurial activity.  
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Criticism of state incentives and direct investment in high growth 
entrepreneurship often centers on the fact that these funds are targeted to select industries 
and relatively elite circles within the economy. Small business advocates favor 
entrepreneurship policy that is ubiquitous and accessible to a wide cross-section of 
businesses. While targeted strategies aim at jumpstarting entrepreneurial activity in the 
region, ubiquitous strategies aim at spreading the benefits of the innovation economy. 
Both approaches may be necessary for Rhode Island’s economic competitiveness. The 
enterprise development system is in a position to bridge both these strategies by breaking 
down barriers and integrating service delivery in a manner that links high growth with a 
ubiquitous entrepreneurial culture. This type of integrated service delivery could 
encourage entrepreneurship in a wider range of industries, while also creating a support 
infrastructure that acts as a ladder for business growth and the development of 
entrepreneurs.     
The overall goal of increasing the quality and frequency of business creation in 
Rhode Island translates to a need for effective service delivery. Ideally effective service 
delivery would provide affordable access to the resources required by nascent 
entrepreneurs and existing businesses across the full range of local industries, while also 
developing the soft skills of entrepreneurs from various fields. Effective service delivery 
would also compel more people to pursue business opportunities by making the start-up 
process more feasible and running a business more manageable. Furthermore, effective 
enterprise development services would act as an engine for growing the region’s 
knowledge based innovation economy, while also introducing innovation to traditional 
industries.  
Many professionals in the enterprise development field believe that in order to 
achieve effective service delivery the entire system of subsidized business support 
services must be rationalized. Rationalizing the system can coordinate service delivery 
occur in many ways, but it often assumed that coordination implies consolidating 
services, resources, and influence into a central authority. This need not be the case.  
Consolidation threatens support organizations that already compete over limited 
funding from private and public sources. It can also be a non-starter for organizations that 
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control the bulk of resources, if consolidation implies relinquishing control over the use 
of those resources.    
In Rhode Island there is an echoing complaint among economic development 
professionals that there are too many organizations supporting entrepreneurship. This 
claim is made by representatives of these very same support organizations, because they 
must operate in what they perceive to be a highly fragmented and competitive service 
environment. Louis Soares, director of RIEDC’s small business program, Every 
Company Counts (ECC), suggests that competition in the field has both positive and 
negative consequences. On the positive side new support organizations often introduce 
innovations to the field of service delivery. On the negative side competition can result in 
turf conflicts that inhibit collaboration, ultimately acting as a barrier to improving the 
effectiveness of service delivery.    
It is widely acknowledged that competition among publicly subsidized business 
support organizations is an irrational use of public funds, especially if competition does 
not lead to more effective service delivery. But, measures of effectiveness are not agreed 
upon. For example, there is currently a debate in the Rhode Island enterprise 
development system over the merits of quantity versus the merits of quality in service 
delivery. 
  The quality of service delivery sometimes conflicts with strategies that aim at 
providing services to a greater number of businesses and entrepreneurs. Quantity goals in 
government subsidized business services can coincide with political goals – where 
numbers make better headlines than other qualifiers. The number of service transactions 
with clients may increase accessibility measures, but this strategy may fair poorly in 
terms of the value added per client. Moreover, measuring transactions puts support 
organizations that offer similar services in direct competition over clients, yielding a 
constant sum game.   
An alternative approach for the delivery of support services would sacrifice 
quantity for quality, choosing to add more value per client. This approach also has been 
called client based, because the focus is on the development of the client business rather 
than simply on providing greater access to commoditized resources. In Rhode Island this 
client focused approach is taking hold in business incubators and in networks that provide 
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mentors for budding entrepreneurs. In fact, most of the new enterprise development 
organizations in Rhode Island have been conceived on the premise that this client based 
strategy is in high demand.  
Reports of competition and a highly fragmented market among enterprise 
development organizations raise important questions about the effectiveness of both the 
transaction based and client based strategies. Transaction based strategies are less likely 
to yield increases in high growth entrepreneurial activity, but they allow for greater 
access across a wider business population. On the other hand, client based services may 
increase the number of high growth businesses, but these organizations are only catering 
to small segments of the entrepreneur population, which, in turn, is being continuously 
subdivided. These conditions lend credence to arguments for rationalizing the enterprise 
development system, but they also heighten the fears of consolidation.  
 
Rationalizing Service Delivery through Conversation 
In order to establish an innovation economy in Rhode Island, the entrepreneurial 
culture there must flourish, and the enterprise development system must accept this as its 
challenge. Before this can happen the organizations that make up this system must have a 
conversation on how to collectively address this challenge. However, this conversation is 
at an impasse. Attempts to start this conversation have broken down over differences in 
interests – both the interests of clients and the interests of the organizations themselves. 
There seem to be two stereotyped camps in this conversation – the client based 
“innovators” and the transaction based “egalitarians”. For the conversation to continue it 
must be mutually acknowledged that both camps have their merits and their weaknesses. 
At the same time the interests of both camps must be met. 
The camp of “innovators” is composed of several state government funded 
business support organizations, such as the Slater Centers, Urban Ventures, ECC, and the 
Tech Collective among others. The interests of this camp lie in the transformation of the 
Rhode Island economy toward innovation and high growth entrepreneurship. Louis 
Soares from ECC has been a staunch supporter of innovative, value-added business 
support services. His organization has led efforts to rationalize the Rhode Island 
enterprise development system in two ways - first, by centralizing information that makes 
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the system more transparent to the end user, and second, by attempting to foster 
collaborative relationships among support organizations that increase the value provided 
to the client.  
Despite these efforts, collaborative partnerships have failed to gain sufficient 
traction. This is due, in part, to the fact that client focused organizations and transaction 
based organizations measure success in different ways. Innovators have been trying to 
force transaction based organizations to adopt a client based model by competing with 
higher value-added services. However, transaction based organizations are not feeling the 
effects of increased competition, because their number of client touches have not been 
drastically impacted. The result is a highly competitive and contentious environment that 
lacks the trust and communication needed for collaborative service delivery. Without 
collaborative innovations the enterprise development system in Rhode Island may 
continue to fragment as innovative reactions to market demand are forced to accompany 
the creation of new support organizations.  
The transaction based “egalitarian” camp is composed of organizations that 
represent traditional industries, such as manufacturing, retail, and small business 
generally. The largest of these organizations are funded by the federal government with 
matching state government funds. These include the Rhode Island Small Business 
Development Center, the Rhode Island Manufacturing Extension Service, the Rhode 
Island Procurement Technical Assistance Center, and the Rhode Island International 
Trade Office. While these federally funded organizations are not inherently adverse to 
new innovative approaches, they do operate under guidelines that are not entirely specific 
or reactive to Rhode Island circumstances. At the same time federal funding is crucial to 
business support services in Rhode Island. If federal funding is a necessary reality, then 
the equal access, transaction based approach is a necessary reality as well.   
Local government organizations also seek to represent the interests of traditional 
industries. The Providence Economic Development Partnership, directed by Donald 
Eversley, is a municipal level economic development agency that has been actively 
supporting the city’s manufacturing industries and neighborhood retail districts. Eversley 
has felt compelled to play the role of contrarian in the face of a city-wide initiative to 
strengthen the creative economy. Eversley is concerned that the blue collar population 
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which remains the backbone of the Providence economy may be ignored by a creative 
economy initiative that targets knowledge workers and artists. By acting as a contrarian 
Eversley is representing interests that deserve equal access to future economic 
opportunities. 
Perhaps, stereotyping these camps as “innovators” and “egalitarians” is 
unnecessarily dualistic, but it does inform the state of contention within Rhode Island’s 
enterprise development system. Other terms could be used here to describe the camps, 
and the terms selected here are neither used by the organizations themselves nor meant to 
imply strict allegiances. In fact, these terms are selected to reflect a positive view of 
seemingly conflicting interests. Presenting negative views of these interests would not 
help the conversation.  
The real underlying problem is the presence of an “us and them” syndrome in 
Rhode Island’s enterprise development system. The division of identities in the enterprise 
development system reinforces silos of activity that act as boundaries to collaboration. 
Divisive categories only serve to inhibit the conversations that are necessary for 
spreading new economic activity throughout the Rhode Island economy. In order to 
overcome this threat the conflicts must be confronted and dealt with appropriately.  
An appropriate resolution of these tensions must recognize that in the face of a 
rapidly changing economic environment contentions should arise and contrarian views 
should be voiced. Because contrarian views arise when some interests are left out of the 
conversation, the conversation should be widened to include these voices. By allowing 
contrarian views into the conversation the “us and them” syndrome can be diffused 
through the recognition of mutual interests. The fact is all sides want to see the local 
economy adjust and grow in this period of economic change.   
The principles of accessibility and high value-added services can transform Rhode 
Island’s entrepreneurial culture. But, without continued conversations about how to 
integrate and leverage these approaches, the enterprise development system will likely 
maintain insufficient capacity for supporting the necessary level of entrepreneurial 
activity.  
Constraints to collaborative activity need to be identified, removed, and in some 
cases accepted in order for integration of business support service delivery. When this 
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happens, then the conversation can commence, and trust can be established among 
divided organizations. When trust is established then the constraints can be made to 
disappear through collaborative and innovative ideas that meet the variety if economic 
interests in the region and among organizations.   
       
Summary:  
Innovation, Entrepreneurship and Economic Adjustment 
 To this point innovation and entrepreneurship initiatives have gained recognition 
as viable paths to new forms of economic activity that will help Rhode Island adjust to 
the changing economy. As a first step these initiatives have taken action to gain the 
support of stakeholders from the public and private sectors. The resulting swing in policy 
has caused rifts among outsiders, who believe their interests are not sufficiently 
represented in these initiatives. This contention over the representation of interests is 
mixed with unease over the increasingly competitive field of business support service 
delivery.  
It is clear that encouraging region-wide economic change requires the adaptation 
of various institutions. Secondary education, research universities, the enterprise 
development system, and forums for business collaboration are just a few of the fields 
that must adapt to change. What is, perhaps, more important is that these institutions must 
also lead the process of economic change within the region.   
 It is also clear that the Providence regional economy will not be successfully 
transformed simply through the acquisition of resources such as R&D funding, serial 
entrepreneurs, and equity investment. These are important inputs, but harnessing the 
activity of economic actors through structures that promote participation in the 
innovation economy is tantamount for success.  
If collaboration truly is Rhode Island’s competitive advantage, then this 
advantage must be strengthened in a bottom-up fashion. Collaboration is both a practice 
and a skill. When cultivated, collaboration will pay dividends for those who incorporate 
this practice into their business operations. If collaboration is viewed as a top-down 
strategy, then the dividends will be limited to elite circles.     
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Transforming Rhode Island’s economy will also require breaking old cultural 
patterns such as those instilled through decades of patronage. Rebuilding trust in 
government and business should be a central goal of economic initiatives in Rhode 
Island. Managing change is not easy, and without trust it is near impossible. At the same 
time stakeholders must realize that the current state of contention is natural, though it 
should not be allowed to impede the adjustment process.  
The future of Rhode Island’s innovation economy seems to lie in integration – 
both regional integration and organizational integration. The Providence region is on a 
course to share in the new economy growth that has long been part of the Boston Metro 
region. Current economic initiatives within Rhode Island have led the charge. However, 
in order to turn these short-run successes into long-run advantages innovation and 
entrepreneurship initiatives will need to transition from a period of striving for 
recognition and separation from old economic models to a period of reconnecting to 
existing economic patterns in the region. Entrepreneurship and innovation initiatives are 
linked in their pursuit of change. The challenge now is to link them to the rest of the 
economy. Studying the processes of trust building and institutional change in an adjusting 
economy will shed some light on how to do this. These topics will be addressed in the 
following chapter.    
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Chapter V 
Social Organization of the Knowledge Economy 
 
 The economic initiatives currently being pursued in Rhode Island arguably 
represent the most ambitious plans for transforming the state’s economy since the age of 
Samuel Slater. Many economists would suggest that this is no coincidence. It is widely 
believed that the modern economy has entered a new age – the age of knowledge 
production. The historical argument goes as follows: just as the mastery of industrial 
manufacturing techniques ushered in the 150 year period defined by industrial 
production, our increasing ability to generate, replicate, communicate, recombine, and 
discard knowledge has marked the beginning of a new period defined by knowledge 
production. Unlike the American Industrial Revolution the Providence region has not 
played a leading role in the emergence of the knowledge economy, and so it must adapt 
in more deliberate ways.  
The knowledge economy is not simply built upon knowledge production. An 
example from the industrial era will help to illustrate this point. As small mills gave way 
to large factories, mass production required new channels of communication and 
distribution. During this time telegraph lines, railroads and highways were important 
infrastructure developments. Likewise, department stores were an example of new 
distribution models and managerial hierarchies played an important role as a 
communication channel. Both of these represent patterns of the social organization of 
mass industrial production. Similarly, knowledge production requires new channels of 
communication and distribution. The internet and wireless technology are obvious 
examples of the new infrastructure, but the presence of these technologies tells us little 
about how to act and how to organize social relations. In the knowledge economy 
production is only part of the challenge.    
 Acquiring the resources for knowledge production, though expensive and 
protracted, is a relatively un-mysterious endeavor. Combining investment and skilled 
labor can yield research findings and the development of new products. Certainly, the 
productivity of new knowledge will vary, and part of this will be due to the social value 
of that knowledge. There are fairly sophisticated methods of predicting the social (and 
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monetary) value of a new product, which serves to rationalize the process of knowledge 
production in R&D labs.  
 However, another aspect of the productivity of knowledge is bound to the manner 
in which knowledge is collected and distributed. R&D may lead to new technologies, but 
the productivity of that technology may depend on how it is applied and recombined with 
other technologies8 often across organizational boundaries. The process of 
communication is much more mysterious than the knowledge production process. The 
necessary resources and the most efficient methods of organizing communication are not 
at all clear, because communication is very circumstantial – even subjective. Moreover, 
the communication of economic knowledge has no center of production that resembles 
the R&D lab. Knowledge is ubiquitous, and new combinations of existing knowledge can 
produce value with the potential for better cost-effectiveness than generating new 
knowledge.  
 At the same time there are social practices and forms of organization that promote 
or inhibit communication. Casson (2000) points out that since information (a precursor of 
knowledge) is easily transferred, appropriating returns may be more difficult, and the 
costs of communication can become high. Casson also states that, “embedding 
communication within an institutional framework helps to speed up communication, 
reducing misunderstandings, and provide moral checks on deceit” (2000, pg. 119). 
Assuming this line of argument, the productivity of a knowledge economy is tied to the 
effectiveness of its institutional framework.   
 Examples from Rhode Island will help to explain how organizational 
communication creates the foundation of a region’s institutional framework. Challenges 
to the future of Rhode Island’s knowledge economy can be explained in terms of 
organizational communication. Misunderstandings, lack of trust, and other barriers to 
communication all negatively impact the workings of a knowledge economy. To some 
extent each of these problems are evident in Rhode Island.           
 Interviews done with Rhode Island’s economic development professionals 
provide some useful evidence. When asked about the biggest challenges faced by their 
                                                
8 See Lester and Piore (2004) on the role of radio and telephone industries in the development of the cell 
phone.  
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organizations most representatives suggested that obtaining enough of some important 
input resource (funding, talent, investment deal flow, and membership) tops the list. 
However, when asked about how to better obtain these important resources several 
interviewees defaulted to complaints about the way that other organizations fail to 
communicate and cooperate with their own. Multiple interviewees used terms such as 
“silos”, “fragmentation”, “inflexibility”, and “bureaucracy” when discussing the 
enterprise development system. Other remarks demonstrate a pointed lack of trust in 
specific organizations. One interviewee describes a situation in which the organization 
was “burned” in an effort to create a partnership. Furthermore, there is widespread 
confusion over the functional meaning of terms such as “entrepreneurship” and 
“innovation”, and this confusion only serves to slow communication about how to 
enhance entrepreneurial and innovative activity in the region. In this way reports from 
interviewees signal barriers to communication within the region’s enterprise development 
and innovation systems.  
 The following sections will investigate the dynamics of knowledge 
communication and social organization in an adjusting economy. Theoretical insights 
about trust and identity will be combined with theories about social mobilization and 
institutional change to discern the implications of Rhode Island’s efforts to grow an 
innovation economy. Also, the conditions of economic adjustment within an emerging 
knowledge economy should be made clear.  
 
Social Adjustments to the Knowledge Economy 
 The transition from an industrial economy to a knowledge economy can be 
described in a number of ways. The changing environment can be seen in a long trend of 
employment shifting away from the manufacturing sector, or in the changing skills of the 
workforce, or in the emergence of knowledge-intensive technology industries, or in a 
reversing trend in the size distribution of U.S. companies, or in the growing role of 
outsourcing and inter-firm cooperation throughout supply chains. Each of these changes 
reveals some aspect of how competition is adapting to and extending the knowledge 
economy.  
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 For regions such as Rhode Island changes in the competitive environment 
requires adjustments in the ways that organizations behave and the ways that institutions 
influence this behavior. Audretsch and Thurik (2004) suggest that regions can gain a 
sustainable advantage by supporting innovative and entrepreneurial activity. But, in order 
to understand what is implied by this call for innovation and entrepreneurship, perhaps, 
some examples are needed to distinguish these from the previous patterns of the 
industrial economy.   
Based on observation of the changing economic environment, Audretsch and 
Thurik (2004) present “A Model of the Entrepreneurial Economy” which distinguishes 
the characteristics of the emerging entrepreneurial model of the knowledge economy 
from the waning managerial model of the industrial economy. They describe the 
managerial model as one of large scale production that finds advantage in a supply of 
unskilled labor as well as low capital costs. Under this model the desire for certainty and 
continuity yields internalized production for improved efficiency. Also, they suggest that 
the premium on certainty and predictability leads to enduring financial relationships with 
banks, which enjoy long-term relationships and predictable returns. These financial 
relationships are tempered by the attitude that a business failure is a mortal failure. 
Audretsch and Thurik describe leadership under the managerial model as autocratic and 
supervisory, where work is distributed to employees on a transactional basis. Finally, 
government policy in the managerial model is perceived as a constraint on big business 
through anti-trust, industry regulation, and public ownership.  
In contrast, Audretsch and Thurik (2004) present the entrepreneurial model, 
which is built upon knowledge production, communication, and commercialization. 
Highly skilled labor and entrepreneurs are the competitive inputs to this economic 
system. Change and uncertainty are the norms, favoring efficiency through internal 
flexibility and market transactions, rather than bureaucracy and hierarchical production. 
Audretsch and Thurik describe uncertainty as a reason for increased communication via a 
network of partners that facilitates the exchange of new ideas. Financing is also a 
network function in the entrepreneurial economy as businesses may partner with multiple 
investors over the lifespan of the company. Equity investors specialize by industry and/or 
stage of growth in order to better recognize a firm’s capabilities and profit opportunities. 
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This specialized, incremental system of finance operates in a manner that distributes the 
calculated risks of inevitable entrepreneurial failures. Audretsch and Thurik characterize 
entrepreneurial failure as a contribution to the learning process, which is accompanied by 
the desire to recycle talent from unsuccessful ventures. Leadership in the entrepreneurial 
model is described as democratic and transformational, where leaders motivate and 
facilitate workers in discovering and implementing new innovations. Finally, Audretsch 
and Thurik find that government policy under the entrepreneurial model is enabling, 
targeting growth by supporting the inputs that contribute to knowledge production, 
communication, and commercialization. 
The juxtaposition of these two economic models may yield clear categorical 
distinctions, but within economic regions distinctions between these two “models” are 
less clear as their expressions are intertwined in a world that operates on both models. In 
Rhode Island the changing economic model is contemporaneous with a process of 
economic adjustment following a period of decline.    
Determining which factors constitute the ability of regions to adapt to change and 
adjust existing patterns of economic activity, particularly among declining regions, has 
been a long-studied question in the field of economic development. This is a complex 
question that can be approached from a variety of angles. However, there are a series of 
arguments that deal with the social organization of economic change that may prove 
useful given the conditions in Rhode Island. These arguments will be briefly introduced 
here in order to demonstrate their relevance, while detailed discussion of their insights 
will follow.  
When decline is viewed from a resource base perspective it is easy to become 
convinced that the economic rational upon which regions are sustained may be lost over 
the course of history. Sabel (1992) chronicles the logic of arguments which suggest that 
some regions simply don’t have the capacity to rebound from the vicious circle of 
decline. He points out that inherent to several of these arguments is an influence of a 
protestant ethic, which intimates that only a select few are destined to prosper. In other 
words, fate, hard work, and an individual’s virtues are seen as the foundations of 
economic prosperity from this perspective. In opposition Sabel argues that economic 
activity is social activity and trust is the touchstone of economic growth. He describes 
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how trust can be created, rather than being simply an accidental byproduct of local 
circumstances. Building trust from conflict involves reshaping the boundaries of identity. 
Inflexible boundaries of identity are burdens to an adjusting regional economy.   
Safford (2004) presents an argument about economic change in declining regions 
based on the role and structure of social capital mobilization. Youngstown, Oh and 
Allentown, Pa. are used as regional case studies, to demonstrate how a dense network of 
social capital is not always ideal in the face of economic adjustment. His findings suggest 
that beyond creating density in social networks, “it is more important that the structure of 
social relationships facilitate interaction – and mobilization – across social, political and 
economic divisions” (2004, pg. 2).  
Several authors have studied the role of institutions in regional economies. 
Saxenian (1994) made famous the comparison of Silicon Valley and Massachusetts’ Rt. 
128 region, which followed divergent approaches to developing innovation economies. 
Her findings suggest that organizations situated within regions with strong support 
institutions are able to innovate more rapidly, due to more efficient methods of 
communicating and sharing knowledge. Similarly, Wolfe and Gertler (2002) find that the 
process of economic adjustment is best achieved through the re-creation of existing 
institutional capacities. Institutional change is said to take place through learning, which 
serves to adapt capacities to the demands of the rapidly changing economy. However, if 
learning processes are reactive to individual challenges rather than proactive to shared 
opportunities, then institutional fragmentation may take hold. Wolfe and Gertler 
underscore the importance of a different ethic - one of reflexivity – where concern for the 
“other” (as opposed to the self) helps to facilitate communication. Without reflexivity 
economic adjustment may resemble a tournament rather than a conversation.     
Finally, Aldrich and Martinez (2003) describe how new industry populations 
emerge and thrive. They suggest that learning and legitimacy, as seen in the eyes of the 
society, are vitally important for the growth of these populations. Aldrich and Martinez 
point out that this process of market creation (and institutional re-creation by extension) 
is a balance of cooperative and competitive behaviors. But, they emphasize that 
cooperative behavior is indispensable, because, “successful collective action at the 
population and community levels allows entrepreneurs to create environments favorable 
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to their existence” (2003, pg. 367). These favorable environments are created through a 
collective process of institutional change. They go on to suggest that institutional 
environments can be shaped by government efforts - “state sponsored associations, 
alliances, and other activities can also create strong incentives for organizations and 
populations to engage in mutualistic activities, as well as a compliance structure for 
reducing the likelihood of competitive activities” (2003, pg. 388). 
Together these arguments explain a fair portion of the local circumstances in 
Rhode Island, where trust, silo boundaries, participation, dense social networks, 
fragmentation, institutional change, and market creation are all parts of the economic 
adjustment process. The next sections seek to provide a thorough understanding of how 
to adapt these conditions for economic change.     
 
Trust and Identity 
 Conflict is ever-present in the economic life of regions, through good times and 
bad. However, during periods of widespread economic change parties to a conflict can 
become balkanized, undermining the capacity for a region to adjust to and compete in a 
changing environment. Sabel (1993) suggests that regions which are able to regulate 
conflict are better prepared to sow the seeds of fertile economic activity. According to 
Sabel, it is the process of creating trust, long believed to be impossible as an act of will, 
that can help a regional economy regulate the conflicts that accompany change.  
 Sabel defines trust as, “mutual confidence that no party to an exchange will 
exploit the other’s vulnerability” (1993, pg. 1133). Vulnerability is described as a “hold-
up” problem, where upon committing resources to a venture, other parties are in a 
position to renegotiate the terms, forcing more investment and sacrifice on the part of the 
first mover. Within a neoclassical or liberal framework self-interested parties might be 
expected to maximize their returns through hold-up tactics. Thus, there is little room for 
trust. In a regional economy this means that collective action in the process of change 
will be weak, and competing interests are left to go it alone.  
 However, going it alone is not an option within regions that have experienced 
economic decline. Fading resources are not attractive to any interests, and actors within a 
declining region have few options, but to recombine and leverage existing resources. Re-
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establishing trust in contentious environments is necessary for this process of 
revitalization.  
 Sabel points out that the stories of trust relations within regional economies often 
hinge on a sense of common history, where trust is a byproduct of some shared identity, 
even if trust was not the intended outcome of that history. According to Sabel, the 
problem with these stories is that they fail to recognize that conflict is ever-present and 
the sense of common history is merely a byproduct of storytelling itself. History is 
rewritten time and again by those who seek to alter the framework of trust relations. 
Sable’s example of the relations between post WWII Japan and the U.S. are illustrative of 
this point. The challenge for building trust is to rewrite history, or find mutual interests, 
among conflicting parties, and this requires the manipulation of the boundaries that 
define group identity.  
 Barth (1969), using ethnography as his tool, studies the boundaries of identity in 
ethnic relations, but his findings may also inform the process of identity formations in 
regional economic relations. Barth’s work highlights the factors that contribute to the 
maintenance of identity boundaries as well as the circumstances under which actors 
change identities. He maintains that participation in some form of social identity takes 
place because there is a social unit that continues through time despite the exchange of 
actors across the unit’s boundaries and despite changes to the cultural artifacts that at any 
point in time might distinguish an actor’s identity. The key to the maintenance of identity 
boundaries lies in a mutual sharing of values by which actors are judged. Barth writes 
that identity, “implies a claim to be judged, and to judge oneself, by those standards that 
are relevant to that identity” (1969, pg. 14). He also points out that, “on the other hand, a 
dichotomization of others as strangers, as members of another ethnic group, implies a 
recognition of limitations on shared understandings, differences in criteria for judgement 
of value and performance, and a restriction of interaction to sectors of assumed common 
understanding and mutual interests” (1969, pg. 15). From this it is not difficult to infer 
that distinct identities, even among parties to conflicting economic relations, serve to 
reduce common understanding and mutual interests.  
 The lessons that Barth puts forth involving the process of changing identity 
include insights on acceptance, co-dependence, and personal motivation. Even within 
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ethnic relations the mechanisms of acceptance resonate with the status of regional 
economic relations. Acceptance into another identity may depend upon stated devotion, 
payment, advantage to members of the accepting group, and the ambitions of all 
influential stakeholders.  
 An example might serve to bring the similarities into focus. In Rhode Island there 
are some organizations are bound by a shared interest in enhancing innovation and 
entrepreneurship, while other organizations are bound by opposition to these initiatives, 
because their interests not represented by these strategies as they have been implemented. 
The separation of these groups has been referred to as creating silos, because of the 
apparent boundaries that separate interests and types of economic activity.  
 However, crossing the boundaries of these silos might not be easily achieved. If 
an organization would like to participate in innovation projects, that organization must be 
accepted by those that control the direction of the innovation initiative. This acceptance 
would surely include some stated devotion to the principles and performance of the 
innovation initiative, because weak membership and internal conflict are unwanted. At 
the same time commitment of resources to the innovation initiative may be required in 
some cases for membership. Additionally, the perceived advantages of allowing new 
member organizations into initiatives combine with the ambitions of stakeholders to 
determine if certain organizations are allowed to become involved. Conversely, personal 
motivation to become identified with innovation in Rhode Island may depend upon the 
alternative options available to an organization as well as the performance of 
organizations involved with the innovation initiative.  
 According to Barth, co-dependence functions differently than acceptance, because 
identities are not wholly exchanged, but the barriers between those identities are reduced. 
In his classes Barth tells stories of regions that act as centers of trade along the coast of 
the Indian Ocean, where multiple ethnic identities are found. The constant interaction of 
trade spreads common understanding and mutual interest, multiplying the overlaps 
between identities and reducing contention. Barth states that, “in the pursuit of 
participation in wider social systems to obtain new forms of value they  
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(identity groups)9 can choose between the following basic strategies:” 1) assimilate into 
the larger social system, 2) participate as a minority, 3) adopt practices, but do not 
participate in the larger social system.  
 These same strategies hold true for organization deciding how to move forward in 
a changing economic environment. For example, organizations that provide services to 
traditional manufacturing industries could 1) shift their services to meet the needs of 
emerging industries, 2) continue to represent traditional industries, while connecting them 
to the innovation economy, or 3) operate as in the past, using new technologies, without 
connecting to emerging industries. Co-dependence forces these decisions. While the third 
option reflects an individualistic approach, the first and second options are both co-
dependent approaches in adjusting economies. 
 Sabel cites mutual dependence as the focal point of shifting economic 
development strategies. The difference between co-dependence and mutual dependence 
might simply be the recognition of the need to work with minority sectors and declining 
industries in the process of economic adjustment. Sabel describes three models of 
economic development as seen from the role of state government, which progress toward 
to government facilitating the recognition of mutual interests among the array of a 
region’s organizations and industries. The first strategy began in the 1970’s when state 
governments became weary of “smokestack chasing” and shifted toward supporting 
young technology-intensive industries. Advances in high-technology industries were 
expected to filter down to traditional industries, resulting in improved productivity. The 
focus of policy in this model was to reduce the barriers to innovation through better 
access to capital and technology. Public-private relationships were created to manage the 
accumulation and distribution of these resources.  
 The second model, beginning in the 1980’s, emphasized the importance of related 
services such as marketing and workforce training. Known as the extension-service 
model, it took at different stance on traditional industries, which would no longer be 
“abandoned” in favor of emerging industries. Rather, traditional industries would become 
laboratories for process and product innovation that could help overcome the high costs 
                                                
9 My parenthesis 
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of local labor. Entire industries, such as automotive and textiles, became the target of this 
policy approach, which promoted organizational collaboration along supply chains.  
 By the 1990’s a third model of state-led economic development was forming. 
Sabel suggests that this model was created upon the realization that neither the resources 
nor services provided by the previous two models were the primary causes of successful 
economic development. This model attributes successful economic development policy to 
cooperative efforts among informal networks that include industries, labor unions, 
educational institutions, banks, and politicians. Sabel writes that, “what mattered was the 
social system by which packages of programs were defined and administered, rather than 
the precise definition of any single program or service” (1993, pg. 1152). Under this 
model state government encourages actors to define their needs through collaborative 
networks.  
 By relying upon the network of actors to communicate their mutual interests the 
state becomes better informed and is enabled to make better decisions for the local 
economy. At the same time collaborative networks function as forums for reorganizing 
local industries, where discussion of interests and capacities can lead to new perspectives 
and innovative ideas for increasing productivity or developing new products. 
Furthermore, discussion of overlaps and gaps within industries serves to clarify 
entrepreneurial opportunities.  
 Sabel suggests that state governments must also play an active role in this model 
by shaping indirectly the economic actors’ identity as well as their interests in order to 
reorganize programs and policy. By getting actors to communicate their interests in 
efforts to inform policy, government enters a conversation with these actors and can play 
an influential role.  
 Sabel warns that this third “cooperative” model only operates efficiently when 
organizations are secure in their autonomy to voice their interests while also being 
flexible enough to realign those interests through a collaborative process. Sabel calls this 
balance of autonomy and flexibility a dynamic of “reflexivity”, where identities overlap 
in the recognition of mutual interests. This is seen as a community of interests shared 
through greater communication among organizational actors, and within this type of 
community trust can be expected to thrive.  
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However, the negotiation and communication of unified interests may prove 
unsuccessful given weak trust relations. Entrenched opposition, those who find the 
current situation acceptable or the alternatives unacceptable, may break the cycle of 
cooperation. In Rhode Island, there is a cooperative network which aims at building an 
innovation economy, but entrenched opposition comes from traditional industries and 
traditional service providers. Untangling entrenched opposition requires substantial 
capacity for negotiating across interests. As will be described in the following section the 
structure of cooperative social networks and the capacities of the institutional 
environment can either inhibit or assist the negotiation process.  
 
Social Mobilization and Institutional Change  
Building cooperative networks begins with a process of social mobilization, 
whereby a select group of actors are engaged in efforts to lead change - in this case 
economic change. Social mobilization can be analyzed in multiple ways, but a popular 
approach is by characterizing the ways in which social capital is leveraged. Safford 
(2004) uses the following definitions to describe social capital: “Social capital refers to 
the resources available to actors which derive from their location in the structure of social 
relationships (Adler and Kwon, 2002); the expectations for action within a given 
community that affect the economic goals and goal seeking behavior of its members 
(Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993)” (2004, pg. 5).  
Safford details the preeminent views on the nature of social capital, which include 
the communitarian perspective championed by Robert Putnam and the social 
mobilization approach described by Theda Skocpol. The communitarian approach 
focuses on the ability of social capital to create higher levels of trust and cooperation, 
through which communication and norms of reciprocity ease transaction costs and 
facilitate collective action. In this view dense social networks are assumed to be 
conducive to the general welfare of the community by taking advantage of shared 
identities and the willingness to combine resources for the collective interest.  
In contrast the social mobilization approach suggests that conflict is ever-present 
in community affairs, and in some cases sharp conflict can lead to competition for control 
of power and resources. The underlying point is that social capital can be leveraged for 
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the benefit of sub-cultures or factions. If the interests of powerful and densely connected 
factions outweigh the interests of the general community in places of authority, then a 
fragmentation of the community’s social structure can be expected. Conflict can be 
expected from these situations as well.    
 Safford’s analysis of two closely matched adjusting economies (Youngstown and 
Allentown) finds that network density can be counter-productive to the interests of the 
community, if dense networks segregate portions of the community from the adjustment 
process. When factions do not communicate effectively, then alternative visions of 
economic change may compete, yielding scattershot plans that ultimately find less 
support than unified plans.  
In democratic communities unrepresented interests find ways to make their voices 
heard. This is the case with economic development professionals in Rhode Island who 
use phrases like “creative economy mafia” to describe how power seems to be over-
represented by the interests of emerging industries and the highly-skilled workforce.  
To ease these types of tensions Safford recommends a social mobilization process 
that has few boundaries to participation. In his analysis boundaries to participation are 
seen in the structure of the social networks that take the lead in initiating change. When 
the social networks are disconnected from key stakeholders or entire populations, then 
conflict and dissention can be expected. But, when barriers to entry are reduced then 
under-represented factions can join the ongoing and unified deliberation. Barriers to entry 
may reflect existing relationships or strong signals of identity that emphasize differences 
between groups rather than similarities. In his case studies Safford found that the better 
connected networks (Allentown) had more success in the economic adjustment process.     
In Rhode Island innovation and entrepreneurship initiatives are in a catch-22 
situation when it comes to barriers to entry. On the one hand, these initiatives are pushing 
for change which requires a new vision of economic activity. On the other hand, the 
focus on “innovation” and “entrepreneurship” presents metaphorical and even functional 
barriers to entry for some organizations and populations. While innovation is being 
marketed as a ubiquitous practice, the organizations that have been involved in these 
efforts tend to already be highly innovative. The BIF experience laboratory’s focus on 
enhancing retail shopping experiences will be an interesting test of the ubiquity of 
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innovation. Will it be the largest shopping malls and boutique shops that receive the 
benefits or will the benefits also impact the locally owned corner store? Even posing this 
question raises related questions about whether a corner store should be involved in an 
innovation initiative, and that is where the barrier arises. Perhaps the corner store owner 
could derive value from such involvement, but how would she know if the program does 
not target corner stores or does not communicate relevant applications and ways to 
become involved.  
Similarly, entrepreneurship is an obvious target of the enterprise development 
system, but the focus on high growth entrepreneurship presents a barrier to innovation in 
small business environments. Malizia and Feser (1999) suggest that there are qualitative 
differences in the distinction between entrepreneurial businesses, new businesses, and 
small businesses, and these distinctions should be reflected in the types of support 
services provided by development organizations. While this may very well be true, the 
implications for social mobilization are that the enterprise development system may 
become fragmented, and indeed it has in Rhode Island. In order to address these 
challenges, some level at which the interests of corner stores or small business support 
centers overlap with boutique shops and technology firm incubators must be recognized 
and communicated.  
Safford points out that the true impact of social mobilization lies in the 
“stickiness” of the structures it creates. Stickiness refers to the path dependency of social 
structures and identities, whereby future interactions are made more probable by past 
interactions. Stickiness is also a function of institutional capacities. Institutions are more 
than social structures in that they house the normative values through which social 
structures develop. Of course, institutions also change, and this change is led by 
reflexivity in conversation and social behavior, or by a change in the balance of power. In 
the process of adjusting to the knowledge economy there must be reflexivity between 
practitioners of the entrepreneurship model and the managerial model described by 
Audretsch and Thurik. The more adaptable institutions are, then the less sticky will be the 
structures created through social mobilization.  
 Wolfe and Gertler (2002) find that the process of economic adjustment is best 
achieved through the re-creation of existing institutional capacities. They suggest that 
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social learning is at the heart of economic adjustment. Wolfe and Gertler write, “the 
process of innovation and institutional adaptation is essentially an interactive one in 
which the means for establishing supportive social relations and of communicating 
insights and knowledge in all its forms are crucial to the outcomes” (2002, pg. 3). They 
claim that learning by institutions is a higher order of learning, whereby, “self-monitoring 
of the learning process itself becomes an integral feature of the institutional structure” 
(2002, pg. 3). By speeding up the learning process, adaptation is likewise sped-up and 
inefficient norms are replaced by those that facilitate development. In this way learning 
and forgetting are tied to the process of economic adjustment.  
  Wolfe and Gertler believe that economic growth and integration of regions 
occurs through technological and institutional advances, which are structured so that 
knowledge is collected and distributed through a wide social network. The structure of 
the institutional learning network is critical to the adjustment of a regional economy. 
They write that, “long periods of growth and decline in industrial economies result from 
the measure of complementarity, or lack thereof, between the prevailing organization of 
the production process and the dynamics of the socio-political institutional structure” 
(2002, pg 10).  
 However, distributed learning does not necessarily address the issue of power 
relations found in some instances of social mobilization. Institutions can be co-opted by 
power relations, and in Providence’s long period of patronage regimes these power 
relations took their toll on the capacities of local institutions. One reason for this is that 
patronage was fed by a level of secrecy due to the inherent corruption of the practice. 
Current challenges to open communication in Rhode Island may stem from this tradition. 
Wolfe and Gertler point out that, “the inability to engage in the talk that can build trust 
and mutual understanding often reflects the absence of a tradition that values the presence 
of these kinds of public institutions” (2002, pg. 12).  
 Referring back to Sabel, there are ways to build trust and communication where it 
is currently lacking, and the state can play a major role in forming trust relations and 
strengthening the capacities of local institutions. This can be achieved through the very 
organizations that the state sponsors in furthering economic development. Wolfe and 
Gertler defer to DiMaggio and Powell (1991) by quoting, “changes in organizational 
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structures and processes reflect changes in the broader sets of institutional norms and 
rules in which they are embedded” (2002, pg 9). By this account there is clearly a process 
of institutional change occurring in Rhode Island. However, to the degree that Rhode 
Island’s state-led economic development organizations conflict with entrenched interests, 
they may actually be forcing the process of institutional change rather than encouraging 
change through reflexivity in broader local institutions.   
 Here there are two aspects of institutional change in plain view – institutional 
learning and institutional drag. Institutional learning has been explained as self-
monitoring for efficient adaptation, but institutional drag reflects constraints on social 
behavior that are slow to adapt. Wolfe and Gertler frame these as negative and optimistic 
perspectives on the role of institutions, but it should be expected that both learning and 
drag will coexist within changing regions.  
 The problem of institutional drag is that it impacts the ability for institutions (and 
organizations) to socialize individuals with the norms that would prove successful in the 
emerging economy. This issue is heightened by the nature of the economic value of 
knowledge, which tends to diminish when it is more widely available. Conversely, the 
knowledge that is embodied by individuals and not widely known, tacit knowledge, 
increases in value. Therefore, the institutional drag in Rhode Island that seemingly is 
anchored by a tradition of secrecy may hold greater economic value for select individuals 
and networks through which secrets and favors travel, but will not maximize the social 
value of knowledge through open forums of communication. Drag implies that the 
remnants of past culture hold on into the present even when those norms are no longer 
favorable. The inability of some to identify with the initiatives that are leading the 
process of change in Rhode Island may cause them to hold onto old norms even longer.   
 Once again, Sabel’s call for recognition of mutual dependence plays an important 
role in combating the effects of drag. In Rhode Island patronage acted a form of 
economic security, and Sabel presents a method for introducing a level of security to in 
new and unknown patterns of economic activity. According to Wolfe and Gertler, Sable 
recommends learning along with monitoring, whereby parties, “ensure that the respective 
gains from learning are distributed among them according to standards that they have 
agreed upon” (2002, pg. 12). Monitoring allows for those who do not trust or readily 
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identify with new economic patterns to gain security in the process of change. Of course, 
monitoring only provides security for those who are party to the agreement in the first 
place, but future agreements about the mutual benefits of adjusting to the knowledge will 
help to ease fears of change.     
 However, it is clear that adjusting to the knowledge economy requires more than 
assimilating actors who do not readily identify with innovation or entrepreneurship – it 
also requires supporting those who do. Just as agreed standards may help the reluctant 
actor to participate in new patterns of economic activity; they also help the ambitious 
actor in efforts to construct new products, new companies, and even new industries. 
Aldrich and Martinez (2003) describe how new industry populations emerge and thrive 
through a process of learning and gaining legitimacy. Since, new industry populations do 
not have recognition within their environment; they must establish ties with suppliers, 
consumers, and the government.  
 The emergence of new economic populations is favored in regions with adaptable 
institutions and accessible support organizations. Aldrich and Martinez suggest that the 
diffusion of information that can occur through learning institutions, “increases the 
likelihood that potential entrepreneurs will perceive opportunities for combining old 
resources in new ways, or at least recognize opportunities in already existing 
populations” (2003, pg. 391). Furthermore, environments that support collective action 
with the institutional capacity to build trust, enhance learning, and monitor agreements 
provide an advantage for the survival prospects of new economic populations. Aldrich 
and Martinez write that, “in contrast to the view that the ‘best’ companies will prevail in 
the modern economy, we have ample evidence that collective action early in the life of a 
population affects which firms prosper and which do not” (2003, pg. 392).  
 
Summary 
 Creating opportunities for mutual benefit through an open process of social 
mobilization is a prerequisite for success in the knowledge economy. Innovation and 
entrepreneurship, two competitive inputs in a knowledge economy, require efficient and 
distributed communication across the various organizations and social relations in a 
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region. The process of economic change unfolds through tradeoffs of uncertainty and 
trust, while conflict is, perhaps, the only certainty.  
However, theory and case studies suggest that state governments are in a strong 
position to promote economic growth by engaging the social networks involved in the 
various aspects of managing patterns of economic activity. In this role the state has two 
charges - first, to collect the information needed to make decisions about how to invest in 
the region’s future; second, to reduce the boundaries that separate economic interests by 
establishing an institutional environment that promotes participation, communication, and 
security.  
In Rhode Island state-led efforts to establish this effective institutional 
environment, while making great strides, still face some challenges. Entrenched 
opposition and the remnants of a secretive culture must be assimilated into the 
conversation of change through an ethos of trust and openness. Leaving unrepresented 
interests behind as the economy moves forward is not a viable option, because this 
merely avoids the practices of reflexivity and self-monitoring, which are the engines of 
change. Learning only happens when the unknown is addressed, and the knowledge that 
can be acquired by recognizing the mutual dependence of Rhode Island’s economic 
actors, traditional and innovation, powerful and weak, will serve to strengthen the 
capacity and resilience of the state’s economic institutions.      
 The next chapter will investigate how entrepreneurship and innovation are being 
implemented in the Rhode Island economy through the stories of two state-level 
organizations. These organizations are central to the process of institutional change in 
Rhode Island, and their successes and challenges are representative of the economic 
issues that the region must face moving into the knowledge economy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 80
Chapter VI 
Institutional Entrepreneurship in Rhode Island 
 
 The institutional environment in Rhode Island is largely influenced by the state’s 
concentration in education, healthcare, and government services. Rhode Island’s 
population of firms is dominated by small and medium sized companies. As a result the 
responsibility of leading economic change in Rhode Island has been assumed by the 
largest stakeholders, universities and hospitals as well as state and local governments. 
Increasingly, the for-profit business community is being asked to participate by informing 
government of its collective needs. At the same time it is recognized that the state must 
improve its stock of high-technology and high-growth businesses in order to compete in 
the knowledge economy. While targeted investment has begun to pay dividends in the 
high-tech, high-growth arena, many of these young industries are not yet strong enough 
to take the lead in economic development initiatives.  
 The result is that despite positive economic growth in Rhode Island for the past 
several years, state government, universities, and hospitals are still the major players in 
an economic environment that seeks strong growth in for-profit sectors. The combination 
of university and hospital research makes Rhode Island a candidate for emerging 
biomedical and life science industries, and much of the targeted investments continue to 
support this field. These investments take the form of R&D funding, infrastructure 
development, and seed financing for young companies. If there is a nucleus of innovation 
and entrepreneurship efforts in Rhode Island it is in biomedical and life science 
industries. There are several other budding industries as well, and together these represent 
Rhode Island’s hopes in the knowledge economy.  
 However, it takes years even decades for emerging industries to mature, and the 
risks of failure are high. So, as investment continues in these emerging industries, 
stakeholders in Rhode Island have sought ways to diversify their investments in the 
knowledge economy by spreading innovation and entrepreneurship as ubiquitous 
practices across the variety of local industries.  
 This chapter will outline how institutional entrepreneurship is being led by state 
funded organizations in Rhode Island to overcome the challenges of building an 
innovative and entrepreneurial economy despite an institutional environment that is thin 
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on large for-profit technology companies, which often play a lead role in this process. 
The stories of select organizations will be used to describe various approaches and 
challenges to institutional entrepreneurship. In each case the structure of social 
relationships play an important role in the relative success of institutional 
entrepreneurship endeavors. These organizations are working within the context of 
innovation and entrepreneurship initiatives as described in Chapter IV. While concepts on 
the social organization of the knowledge economy, presented in Chapter V, will be used 
tools for describing how these institutional entrepreneurs make organizational boundaries 
more malleable, while the balance of power, the level of participation, and the ability to 
create a reflexive value structure will be used as barometers of success. Finally, these 
stories will be presented in sections according to the initiative, innovation or enterprise 
development, with which the organization is most closely affiliated, and these sections 
will be preceded by arguments that resemble best practices for each initiative. 
   
Supporting Innovation 
 As has already been described an efficient structure of communication is vital to 
implementing an economy based on innovation. But, according to Lester and Piore 
(2004), the term efficient may be an inappropriate qualifier. In fact, in their view the type 
of communication that promotes innovation may be quite inefficient. Lester and Piore 
suggest that innovation requires two types of communication, analytical and interpretive.  
Analytical communication is well understood and commonplace within firms and 
R&D labs that focus on developing new products. It is the analytical view that defines 
markets, assesses available resources, and divides the production process into discrete 
actions. As Lester and Piore point out it the analytical view that provides structure to 
firms, as business units are demarcated and chains of command are pronounced. 
However, they also believe that it is the analytical view that threatens the vitality of 
innovation in U.S. companies.  
 In order to understand this last point it is necessary to introduce the counterpart to 
analysis – interpretation. Lester and Piore describe interpretation as the process of 
defining problems. This does not mean solving problems; rather it infers contemplation 
and discussion of what needs to be solved in the first place. Interpretation involves 
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determining the range of problem alternatives that analysis can be used to solve. 
Interpretation is an open-ended process, which means that it can be the epitome of 
inefficiency. While analysis is directed and clearly defined, Lester and Piore liken 
interpretation to a conversation, which merely seeks to be interesting and engaging. 
The temptation of analysis is that it values efficiency, and in the interest of 
efficiency it seeks to solve whatever problem it is presented. Without thoroughly 
exploring the range of problems to work on, one may miss the most interesting questions 
and fall behind those who do find them. According to Lester and Piore, the problem is 
that analysis and interpretation are opposing forces that people may find hard to manage 
simultaneously, even though they are both required in the process of innovation. The 
perceived inefficiency of interpretation has led policymakers to neglect its importance. 
As Lester and Piore put it, “We are in danger of learning the wrong lessons about 
innovation. As a result, we risk neglecting those capabilities that are the real wellspring 
of creativity in the U.S, economy - the capacity to integrate across organizational, 
intellectual, and cultural boundaries, the capacity to experiment, and the habits of thought 
that allow us to make sense of radically ambiguous situations and move forward in the 
face of uncertainty” (2004, pg. 5) 
Lester and Piore believe that interpretation is best achieved by integrating across 
organizational boundaries through a process of open but managed communication. 
Management, here, refers to the opening of boundaries that separate organizations, so that 
the conversation is supplied with fresh views and ambiguities. Examples of this type of 
boundary crossing integration include conversations between otherwise separated 
technical specialists and conversations between producers and end users.  
Lester and Piore describe four spaces in which interpretive conversations can lead 
to innovation. These include the interior of firms, industrial districts (regional economies 
in this case), the regulatory process, and the university. However, they fear that policy 
decisions may be crowding the interpretive process out of these traditional homes to 
innovation. In particular, they cite the institutional interests of reducing barriers to market 
signals and the increasingly corporate sponsorship of university research as challenges to 
the interpretive process. If regions intend to make innovation the bedrock of economic 
activity then they must preserve their interpretive spaces.  
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In terms of best practice Lester and Piore provide several valuable points of 
reference. Perhaps the most important of these is that organizations must value and 
master the interpretive process. As suggested this involves reducing the barriers to inter-
organizational collaboration. For institutional entrepreneurs in regional economies this 
means creating and maintaining interpretive spaces that are non-threatening to 
participants, while stimulating conversations that are intriguing enough to draw in 
participants with a variety of perspectives. Lester and Piore suggest that stimulating 
intriguing conversations requires the skills of a “cocktail hostess”, who not only invites 
guests to the party, but keeps conversations going by continually abstracting and 
communicating the relevance of on-going conversations for the benefit of other guests. 
There is a final step for institutional entrepreneurs, which involves assisting participants 
in making the difficult transitions from interpretation to analysis. For our purposes this 
translates as the institutional capacity to link interpretive conversations to the key 
stakeholders that have access to the assets through which innovative ideas can be turned 
into innovative realities. These assets may be entrepreneurs, capital, R&D facilities, 
business consultants, etc. Together these practices can serve as guides for organizations 
that seek to create new patterns of economic activity.  
 
The Business Innovation Factory 
The Business Innovation Factory is an excellent example of a public-private 
partnership investing in a region’s interpretive space. BIF was started as a non-profit 
partnership where the business, government, and academic communities can discuss the 
most interesting problems to solve. These problems include new business concepts that 
hold vast potential, but lack a forum for testing their viability in a real world marketplace. 
BIF acts as a forum for interpreting the interesting questions and problems in the Rhode 
Island marketplace. The experience laboratory, RIWINS, and healthcare delivery projects 
are all examples of how BIF conversations address problems that are relevant to Rhode 
Island, while also holding commercial potential for scaling nationally or globally. 
BIF is a stakeholder in Rhode Island’s innovation system, but it functions as an 
institutional entrepreneur, because it creates the non-threatening environment for 
traditional innovation stakeholders to collaborate with a wider range of interests. BIF 
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infuses a social value orientation to the process of innovation by creating solutions to 
some of Rhode Island’s intractable social problems, such as the digital divide and the 
effectiveness of healthcare delivery. Organizations that become involved with the BIF are 
encouraged to not only expand their relationships with other organizations, but also they 
way in which they perceive and interact with the Rhode Island community at large.  
The participants in BIF conversations also represent a wider range of perspectives 
than could be expected in a regional innovation system. In many ways conversations are 
facilitated by BIF’s Research Advisory Council, which plays the role of “cocktail 
hostess”. Members of this council are not Rhode Island-centric; the list includes 
professors from Harvard University, Babson College, the University of Southern 
California, the University of Rhode Island, and Brown University, while other members 
are accomplished authors and corporate leaders from companies such as IBM and Proctor 
& Gamble as well as several innovation consulting companies. The charge of this group 
is to direct BIF research in a manner that maintains relevancy for the organization’s 
members by following emerging business trends and providing guidance to collaborative 
projects. In this way BIF links conversations to assets during transition to the analytical 
phase of product development.   
BIF is a membership organization. As Saul Kaplan, BIF Founder and Chief 
Catalyst, suggests, volume is not the primary objective for membership. Currently, 
membership is listed at twenty-two organizations from both the public and private 
sectors. The idea is to create a manageable community of innovators, where 
conversations can thrive and trust can lead to action on collaborative projects. 
Accessibility to ideas flowing through BIF is expanded by information and networking 
forums, which serve to communicate new ideas and best practices in innovation in fields 
ranging from public infrastructure development to managing innovative human resources 
and beyond. These communication forums not only provide new information to regional 
organizations, but they also diffuse the values of innovation so that they become part of 
the local vocabulary. 
Cultural change is an important aspect of how BIF perceives its institutional 
entrepreneurship duties. In a state that is just now emerging from a long period of 
economic decline, changing the value system of public and private organizations is a 
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substantial challenge. For a culture that has been encouraged to favor security over 
opportunity through decades of economic decline, adjusting to the collaborative talk of 
innovation may require some leaps of faith. The fragmented and competitive environment 
for business support organizations in Rhode Island does not favor a swift transformation 
to opportunity seeking collaborative innovation. Organizations that are not ready to 
change based on faith in innovation need other reasons to become involved in the 
economic adjustment process. Organizations that act as institutional entrepreneurs must, 
as McGrath (2003) suggests, examine what it is that motivates organizations to invest in 
innovation before wide-scale change can be expected.  
BIF is not currently aiming at wide-scale change in the Rhode Island economy, at 
least in terms of turning innovation adverse organizations into innovators. Rather, it is 
attempting to build a community of innovators that blaze a trail for the rest of the 
economy. In this way the approach is combination of agency-based and asset-based, 
because it seeks to promote the agency of those who possess knowledge and capital 
assets, but depend upon new collaborative relationships to turn these into innovations.  
For BIF “innovator” is an identity, or a group, that possesses certain 
characteristics, and this identity is both reinforced and heralded as way of signaling how 
others should behave in the knowledge economy. Innovation is a process of social 
mobilization in Rhode Island, which seems to involve drawing sharp distinctions between 
types of economic activity in order to promote the cause of innovation. The fact that the 
innovation agenda would unevenly benefit the stakeholders who share in this exclusive 
“innovator” identity is not a concern, because “innovation is the future”. The fact that this 
may lead to negative consequences due to a lack of broad cultural legitimacy and the 
continued fragmentation of the regions institutional environment is a weakness. It is 
recognized here that building momentum for adjusting to the knowledge economy may 
require this identity formation stage. However, the boundaries of the “innovator” identity 
need to lose their sharp edge, so that traditional industries and low-income populations 
can be encouraged to participate in innovative activities. There are signs that this process 
may already be starting, as tourism interests seem to have infiltrated the innovation 
complex through the proposed retail experience laboratories. But, until the problem is 
recognized as an identity barrier it can not be resolved appropriately.     
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The aggressive pursuit of innovation by BIF and other organizations involved in 
the regional innovation system demonstrates an application of power, which may only 
reinforce the formation of factions in the region’s economy. While BIF is pushing to 
create new institutional capacity in Rhode Island, it still faces the challenge of 
fragmentation. Melissa Withers, Market Development Manager at RIEDC, suggests that 
BIF effectively competes for membership with other state-level business support 
organizations. As the institutional component of Rhode Island’s innovation initiative BIF 
is in a position to influence the practices of other organizations that support innovation in 
the state. But, other support organizations are slow to become partners. There is a 
perception of an uneven power balance that threatens the influence of other organizations 
whether they are competitors or partners.  
For example, the STAC innovation policy recommendations presented to the 
Rhode Island General Assembly are all likely to be passed, while other organizations 
struggle to lobby for legislative reforms. The influence of innovation on Rhode Island’s 
policy agenda can be daunting for organizations that represent other interests even if they 
overlap with the innovation initiative.  
The tension between different organizational advocates of overlapping business 
communities can be seen as competition for attention and resources, but it can also be 
viewed as a reaction to centralized power and struggles of social mobilization. RIEDC 
and BIF would like to partner with more support organizations around innovation 
initiatives, but the aggressive push for change might be ostracizing these very same 
organizations. One interviewee said that RIEDC led initiatives are moving forward like a 
train, and while the train will make regular stops at the station, if you don’t get on board 
the train will not wait. This comment seems to reflect a stance that other organizations 
ought to adapt to RIEDC-led initiatives, because these initiatives will not adapt to other 
organizations. This is a hard-line approach that displays an uneven perception of mutual 
interest, and a confidence that comes with uneven power. While the need for change is 
evident, so is the need for trust, and both should be addressed by institutional 
entrepreneurs.   
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Supporting Entrepreneurship 
The foundations of entrepreneurship vary depending on the scale at which you 
observe it. From a regional perspective entrepreneurship relies upon a willing culture, an 
effective network of support services, an attractive business environment, and the 
presence of entrepreneurial talent. From a firm or industry perspective entrepreneurship 
relies upon innovative ideas, a market that allows for monopoly profits, and the presence 
of talent. From a personal perspective entrepreneurship requires a sense of self-efficacy, 
or a can-do spirit, a sense of control over resources and the competitive environment, the 
know-how needed to assert that control, and the presence of an opportunity.  
Supporting entrepreneurship requires each of these factors to come together. It is 
typically assumed that state programs can influence only one of these factors – the 
presence of effective support services. However, in Providence building an 
entrepreneurial culture will require much more. Increasingly, entrepreneurship support 
services are being tailored to help develop the skills of an entrepreneur, while also 
providing the resources needed to start and manage a business and assistance in 
navigating a particular industry or regulatory environment. Furthermore, entrepreneurial 
networks are designed to assist entrepreneurs in recognizing opportunities for business 
ideas as well as making contacts with mentors and potential business partners. However, 
at the most basic level entrepreneurship is a personal act, and developing the capabilities 
to recognize opportunity and marshal resources towards that end are the staring points for 
growing an entrepreneurial culture.  
Lichtenstein and Lyons (2001) present a model of entrepreneurial development 
that focuses on the development of individual entrepreneurs. Their model is a client-
focused model in that it takes as its objective assisting in the development of personal 
capabilities rather than the only the creation of companies. This is a fundamentally 
backwards approach considering the aim of entrepreneurship strategies is the creation of 
companies, particularly those that have the potential to grow. However, if the obstacle to 
growing an entrepreneurial culture is seen as a lack of entrepreneurs, then developing the 
capacities of individuals may be the most direct route to circumventing this obstacle.  
In an effort to create a framework for developing entrepreneurs Lichtenstein and 
Lyons propose a fully collaborative system of service delivery, which tailors services to 
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the particular profiles of entrepreneurs, and then helps them climb the ladders of venture 
scale and personal ability. The entrepreneur–centric system they have imagined and 
implemented in several regions across the country presents a vision of possibilities for the 
collaborative delivery of enterprise development services. The client centered, tailored 
service approach requires fully integrated information sharing of client cases across the 
system’s organizations. It is furthered envisioned by Lichtenstein and Lyons (2005) that 
this system, fully developed, could act as a market that connects entrepreneurs to 
business opportunities and unclaimed market niches. In other words, by centralizing the 
development of entrepreneurs, the market would use the enterprise development system 
as a way of recruiting and attract entrepreneurial talent. This is in addition to the 
companies created through the opportunity recognition of the entrepreneurs themselves.    
Lichtenstein and Lyons term this integrated method of service delivery the 
“Entrepreneurial Development System™,” which has actually been implemented in some 
regions, though not yet developed to the full potential they imagine it possesses. While 
the vision on an entrepreneurship marketplace may be a stretch of reality now, it does 
provide an alternative view for the role of the enterprise development system. This 
example demonstrates how collaborative service delivery can unlock new potential for 
business creation and development in regional economies.  
The first challenge to enacting this prescribed approach is for enterprise 
development systems to target the development of entrepreneurs. In Rhode Island this 
process is solidly underway with several organizations supporting entrepreneurs 
explicitly. Several other organizations support business creation and development, but the 
focus is on the business. These two approaches would need to be reconciled and 
combined under the entrepreneurial development model.   
The second challenge to implementing this model is integrating service delivery 
between a variety of organizations that represent different segments of the business 
environment and act upon different performance measures. In Rhode Island Every 
Company Counts has acted as an institutional entrepreneur focused on integrating 
business support service delivery.  
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Every Company Counts 
Every Company Counts was created as an organization that could help to 
rationalize and maximize the effectiveness of the Providence region’s enterprise 
development system. ECC acts as an information clearinghouse and first point of contact 
for entrepreneurs and small business owners in search of support services. ECC makes 
the enterprise development system more manageable for clients by explaining which 
organizations would meet their needs, while putting them in touch with a known 
associate at the appropriate organization. ECC seeks to maximize the value provided to 
each client, as Louis Soares, Director of ECC, explains, by providing services that go “a 
mile deep and an inch wide.” He suggests that this approach is more effective than 
services that are “a mile wide and an inch deep.”  
While ECC promotes a client focused approach it also seeks to instigate better 
communication among service providers by tracking referrals and establishing 
conversations among these organizations. As such ECC has been acting as institutional 
entrepreneur. The problem to date has been that, other than simply maintaining direct 
contacts with each organization, ECC holds little power to convince organizations to 
begin to collaborate with each other over service delivery. ECC does have partners that 
share in the client focused approach, and, therefore, find greater value in the services that 
ECC provides. But, these partners also hold little sway over organizations that have no 
reason to change based on their own performance measures.  
In fact, Louis Soares believes that without some positive financial motivation 
most enterprise development organizations would find little use in rationalizing the 
enterprise development system. The challenge is that these organizations are insulated 
from client demands for more focused services, because of very particular operational 
guidelines that have been established through various levels of government bureaucracy. 
The performance measures of these organizations are not created to overlap, and they are 
not motivated to do so, based on the structure of funding. Since many organizations 
receive funding on a transaction basis, they are in direct competition for client 
transactions.  
The efforts of ECC have not to been entirely effective in changing the 
institutional environment. But, Louis Soares points out that other organizations such as 
 90
RISBDC may be in a position to gain more support for a unified enterprise development 
system, because that nationally funded organization has control over more resources. The 
problem is that RISBDC is a transaction focused organization, and it might be the most 
challenging organization in which to implement institutional change, because it is mired 
in bureaucracy that responds mostly to national pressures for change.  
The challenge here is to start a conversation that addresses the interests of each 
organization, while also creating better service delivery. But even getting the parties to 
the table has proven difficult. If Rhode Island is serious about developing an 
entrepreneurial culture, then the enterprise development system is a natural place to 
begin. Win-win strategies must be applied in order for the organizations involved to have 
reason for entering and sustaining this conversation. Framing these win-win strategies is 
the responsibility of institutional entrepreneurs.   
ECC’s strategy for integrating service delivery has been described as intent to 
“explode” the supply chain of business support services. By this he means that clients can 
be empowered to seek out different services from different organizations that may be 
most helpful with a particular service. The existing supply chain typically involves 
working with a single organization to meet the various needs a business or entrepreneurs 
may have, from business plan development to financing and technical support. ECC’s 
model would require organizations to collaborate over clients, where one organization 
has greater capabilities for helping entrepreneurs develop their business plan and others 
have more capacity for providing financing or technical support.  
The central challenge to developing this type of integrated system is a matter of 
building trust. Trust is needed between organizations in order for there to be willingness 
to adapt their service delivery model, and trust is needed between service providers and 
clients in order for a mutually beneficial relationship to grow. As Sabel (1993) points out 
building trust requires reframing the stories upon which conflicting assumptions and 
beliefs are constructed.  
It seems that a vision of “exploding” the existing supply chain will do little to 
foster trust in potentially cooperative organizations. At the same time the unwillingness 
to enter into necessary conversations about integrating the enterprise development system 
also does not inspire trust. In order for ECC’s entrepreneurial visions to become a reality 
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a new story must emerge, which depicts prior conflict as an unfortunate 
misunderstanding and presents a vision of a win-win for all organizations involved. At 
the same time the functional and ideological differences of support organizations must be 
overlooked until common ground can be identified and the conversations that promote 
trust can begin. Trust is the necessary precondition for adapting the enterprise 
development system, but this condition can be created through greater reflexivity in the 
efforts of institutional entrepreneurs.   
The boundaries that separate support organizations can be described in terms of 
the inherent differences between performance measures, or they can be described as 
untrusting social relations which inhibit the willingness to make those boundaries more 
malleable. The first description elicits actions that force change, because inherent 
differences may only react to new market conditions. The second description elicits 
actions that seek trust as a precondition of change, through which inherent differences 
can be turned into recognition of mutual dependence and mutual interests. Reducing the 
boundaries between organizations requires emphasizing shared identities without creating 
new barriers. In order for institutional entrepreneurship to be successful in Rhode Island’s 
enterprise development system the organizations involved must not be threatened with 
the idea of change even if change is the goal. Communication between organizations 
should be a learning process, whereby new opportunities are identified in the ambiguities 
between organizations. The potential exists for Rhode Island’s enterprise development 
system to play a major role in strengthening the region’s knowledge economy, and this 
potential is what should bring organizations to the conversation.  
  
Summary 
 
Institutional entrepreneurship through state-level organizations in Rhode Island 
has had positive impacts in framing the state’s expectations for actors in the knowledge 
economy. However, these same efforts also present challenges to the overall 
effectiveness of institutional change in the process of adjusting to the knowledge 
economy.  
In the case of innovation the concentration of power makes institutional 
entrepreneurship quite effective. In fact, it may be too effective if other organizations that 
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support innovative companies fear partnering due to the one-sided distribution of 
influential power. In the case of the enterprise development system power is not held by 
the institutional entrepreneurs, and as a result institutional change has been slow.  
The examples of the Business Innovation Factory and Every Company Counts 
also suggest the structure of social relations underlying the regional innovation system 
and the enterprise development system yield very different performance in terms of 
inviting participation. In the innovation system participation among allied stakeholders is 
quite strong, though participation among actors in the broad economy is weak. In the 
enterprise development system this dynamic is reversed, where participation in 
collaborative stakeholder alliances is weak, but there is broad representation of the 
overall economy in the client base.  
As for enhancing shared values the performances of the two systems also diverge. 
The example of BIF suggests that the values of innovation are easily identifiable and 
shared by an exclusive group of “innovators”, though these values are not necessarily 
ever-present across the region’s organizations and institutions. The case of ECC suggests 
that there is a lack of agreement over the values that should be reflected in the enterprise 
development system. This is likely due to the fact that organizations which segment the 
business environment and act as advocates for sub-sets of this population are bound to 
reflect a wide sample of values.  
Though institutional entrepreneurship in these two systems faces different 
challenges, in some ways these challenges are complementary. Where one system is 
weak the other is strong. As institutional entrepreneurship evolves in Rhode Island it may 
be possible to combine one system’s strengths with the other’s weaknesses. In order to do 
so the two systems must become more closely integrated as innovative and 
entrepreneurial activity take hold in Rhode Island.     
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Chapter VII 
Conclusions 
 
Economic adjustment in the knowledge economy relies upon innovative and 
entrepreneurial activity to create value within firms, to create employment for 
individuals, and to create resilience in regional economies. The pressures of globalization 
and the rapid diffusion of economic knowledge demand that organizations and 
institutions adapt new patterns of economic activity. This paper has examined how this 
transition is taking shape in Rhode Island.  
The method used here for investigating this process has been to observe the 
effectiveness of institutional entrepreneurship in leading these changes. Taking this 
institutional perspective requires background on how and why Rhode Island’s economic 
environment has evolved as it has. An historical look at the state’s economic decline and 
the renaissance of Providence provides the context of economic and institutional change 
that is currently emerging in the region. Rhode Island’s adjustment to the knowledge 
economy is taking place through two over-arching initiatives that aim at strengthening 
innovation and entrepreneurship in the state. These initiatives are being led in part by the 
regional innovation system and the enterprise development system. In order to detail the 
effectiveness of institutional entrepreneurship in the process of economic adjustment, this 
paper has focused on the stories of two state-level organization, the Business Innovation 
Factory and Every Company Counts, which have played central roles instigating 
institutional change.  
The aim of this research is to demonstrate how the effectiveness of institutional 
entrepreneurship – as a means of enacting economic adjustment – is influenced by the 
social structure of regional alliances. In order to answer this question the effectiveness of 
institutional entrepreneurship is measured by three conditions. The selection of these 
three measures is based upon the merits of the agency-based perspective of economic 
development. First, the balance of power in the process of institutional change is selected 
because balanced power combats corruption and protects individual freedoms. Second, 
participation is selected as a measure of effectiveness because greater participation 
reflects lower barriers to the universal human capacity for agency. Third, shared values 
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are used as a measure because they represent the freedom to participate in public dialogue 
as well as the capacity for individuals and organizations to empathize with others.  
Each of these measures allows for greater integration within a changing economy. 
Economic integration is necessary because it promotes change that has a net social 
benefit. Net social benefits are achieved when a wider range of resources can be recycled 
into more productive forms of economic activity. Without integration in the process of 
economic change innovation and entrepreneurship can become destructive forces, and 
they may lose legitimacy within the local culture.     
Furthermore, a variety of concepts related to the organization of social relations 
are used to describe ways that economic activity may become integrated across otherwise 
insulated industries and across organizational boundaries. Trust, identity maintenance, 
social mobilization, and institutional change are all factors that influence and reveal the 
structure of social relations.  
In both cases of the regional innovation system and the enterprise development 
system the effectiveness of institutional entrepreneurship has been mixed. In the case of 
supporting innovation the strong identities of “innovators” and the tightly allied 
mobilization of social networks has led to deeply shared values among a select group, but 
weak participation in terms of volume, and an uneven balance of power. Innovative 
activity seems to be taking hold in elite circles, though there are substantial challenges in 
terms of integrating innovation throughout the regional economy. On the other hand, the 
enterprise development system has a wide base of participation, but institutional 
entrepreneurship in the field has been challenged by a lack of trust relations and an 
inability to mobilize support organizations around common interests.  
Innovation and entrepreneurship are intimately related in the knowledge 
economy. As Rhode Island moves forward with initiatives to support innovation and 
entrepreneurship, it may become increasingly important for the efforts of the innovation 
system and the enterprise development system to become more closely aligned. In many 
ways the weaknesses of one system are complemented by the strengths of the other.  
If the ECC and other support organizations that follow the client-focused 
approach do not have the influence to get the transaction-focused support organizations to 
enter into conversations about integrating the enterprise development system, then 
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perhaps organizations involved with the innovation initiative may hold the power to do 
so. By acting as a third parties that have a shared interest the development of 
entrepreneurial capital in the region, innovation organizations such of BIF may be able to 
facilitate trust-building conversations within the enterprise development system. 
Conversely, collaboration between the innovation system and the enterprise development 
system may assist in diffusing innovation throughout the various segments of the region’s 
business environment.  
Ultimately, the goal of institutional entrepreneurship is to lower the barriers to 
organizational collaboration and integration of regional economic activity. Performing 
the role of an institutional entrepreneur may require a perspective this is unattached to the 
success of any single organization in order to bridge alliances. Institutional 
entrepreneurship focuses on creating non-threatening environments where participants 
can form synergistic relationships even where they are least expected. In this way the 
institutional entrepreneur harnesses the universal human characteristic of agency by 
reducing the barriers to its expression.   
 The Rhode Island economy has witnessed the extremes of economic growth and 
decline over a 200 year period, and now it witnesses a critical opportunity for growth 
once again. The degree to which the region will be able to seize this opportunity for 
growth in the knowledge economy relies heavily on the abilities of its institutional 
entrepreneurs to create environments for social learning where the productivity of 
knowledge can be increased.    
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